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 Abstract 
Social media’s role in the 2016 election was one of many aspects of that election which make it 
unique. Record numbers of Americans were active social media users in 2015-2016, and many 
used the platforms not only for entertainment, but to learn about the news. Social media were 
also used by candidates in novel ways and to unprecedented extents, and the quality of 
information distributed through social media came into question. Previous studies have shown 
that news-related social media use leads to increases in political knowledge and likelihood of 
voting, but the unique circumstances surrounding the 2016 election make generalization of those 
findings to that election perilous. Therefore, this thesis used national survey data from the 2016 
Cooperative Congressional Election Survey to investigate the relationships between news-related 
social media use, political knowledge, and participation specifically in the 2016 election. 
Exploratory factor analyses, logit regressions, and marginal effects were used. Analysis found 
that consuming social media news content did predict higher likelihood of voting in 2016, and it 
found that that effect was partially mediated by an increase in political knowledge. Additionally, 
evidence suggested that whether someone shared, commented on, or forwarded news-related 
content – in addition to consuming it – was found to moderate each of the aforementioned 
relationships, though that finding was not statistically significant. The relationships between 
social media use, knowledge, and voting also varied by state and by party. Further research 
should consider personality in analysis and use experimental, rather than observational, methods 
to the extent possible.  
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Introduction 
Social media is pervasive in many Americans’ daily lives in 2019. To some, it is a way to 
connect with old friends; to others, a way to catalog their daily experiences; and to many others, 
something different. One marked change in social media over the last decade is the development 
of social networking sites as platforms for the dissemination of news. Traditional news outlets 
have inserted themselves into the social media sphere and are one source of the news information 
that is spread across social networking sites, but such sites are also part of Web 2.0 at their core – 
and as such, any site member is empowered to be a source of information as well, with varying 
degrees of influence based on the size of their networks. People and media companies share all 
kinds of news over social media, but whenever “news” is referred to in the rest of this thesis, it 
should be assumed that the term refers to political news specifically. 
This thesis looks at the role(s) that social media news played in the 2016 elections. That 
election cycle saw a rising trend in general popularity of social media, novel use of social media 
by the Republican nominee, interference by foreign interests through social media, social media-
based propaganda loops, and other trends that continue to be identified and investigated. People 
both consumed and engaged with news content over social media, and it can be expected that 
what happened there may have impacted their behavior on Election Day. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I quickly review the development of Web 2.0 and social media, the democratization of 
information, and potential implications for society. At the end of the chapter, I introduce the key 
research questions that guide my analysis and I provide a roadmap for the rest of this thesis.  
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1. Web 2.0, Social Media, and a Shift in the Flow of Information 
Until the 1980s, information mainly was spread one of a few ways: through mass media, 
through education, or by word of mouth. In that traditional media context, word-of-mouth 
information spread was limited, and information flowed in society unidirectionally, flowing from 
a few mass media producers to mass consumers (Mandiberg 2012, 1). Starting in the 1980s, 
technologies like photocopiers, home video cameras, and home computing began allowing one 
person’s information to reach more people without going through mass media (1). Soon after that 
came a boom in home computing, which brought mass access to the internet and dramatically 
increased people’s connectivity with the outside world. Still, that connectivity was limited.  
It can be said that the internet so far has developed through two eras (and is arguably 
about to enter a third). A 2012 blog post from a web design studio provides an oversimplified, 
but useful way to distinguish the eras: in computer science language, Web 1.0 was the “readable” 
era of the internet, Web 2.0 is the “writable” phase, and, while not really realized yet, Web 3.0 
will be the “executable” phase of the internet (WittyCookie 2012). In more detail, “Web 1.0,” 
was mostly a one-way street. Sites made information available to users, but users had little to no 
opportunity to return the favor. In Web 2.0, the internet is a two-way street: sites provide users 
with information, users make use of it and provide information back to the sites, sites update 
their services based on the received data, and the cycle continues (O’Reilly 2007). Importantly, 
this process introduced the possibility of not only making one user’s data available to the 
website, but to other users of the site as well – the birth of social media (Mandiberg 2012, 2).  
Now, in contrast to the rigidly-unidirectional information flow of the pre-1980s, the 
pattern in modern and social media environments is often turned on its head to be bottom-up, as 
well as laterally-oriented (Buckingham 2015; Montgomery & Gottlieb-Robles 2006). David 
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Buckingham, a giant of turn-of-the-century media literacy scholarship, describes this very 
clearly, writing about the general consensus that  
the interactive, participatory possibilities of digital media are believed to transcend the 
limitations of hierarchical, top-down ‘mass’ media and hence to undermine what are seen 
as the authoritarian ‘knowledge politics’ of traditional pedagogy. The potential they offer 
for learners to become creators of knowledge – rather than merely ‘consumers’ has been 
seen by some as little short of revolutionary. (Buckingham 2015, 9) 
Jay Rosen (2007) describes a similar phenomenon, writing a fictional open letter to media 
producers in the voice of “the people formerly known as the audience.” In that letter, he tells 
mass media “You don’t own the eyeballs. You don’t own the press, which is now divided into 
pro and amateur zones. You don’t control production on the new platform, which isn’t one-way. 
There’s a new balance of power between you and us” (15).  
2. Policy Relevance 
“Welcome to the second decade of the 21st century,” Ernest Morrell writes in 2012, 
“where information has been globalized, digitized, and sped up to move at the speed of thought” 
(300). The Pew Research Center estimates that nine in ten Americans use the internet in 2018, up 
from only half of the population in 2000 (Pew 2018a). There are certainly exceptions, groups 
that are less connected than the average (primarily older, rural Americans), but even those 
disparities are rapidly disappearing (Pew 2018a).  
Americans are using the internet to get on social media. In 2008, roughly two in ten 
Americans used social media; by 2010, that had doubled to just shy of four in ten (Hitlin 2018; 
Moore & McElroy 2011, 267). By, 2016 the figure rose to almost seven in ten (Hitlin 2018).  
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Certain social media platforms are more popular than others. By far the most popular is 
Facebook: 68% of Americans report using that platform, compared to 35% using Instagram, 29% 
using Pinterest, 27% using Snapchat, 25% using LinkedIn, and 24% using Twitter (Smith & 
Anderson 2018, 2). Facebook has been the most popular site in every Pew survey since the 
Center began asking about respondents’ use of specific social media sites in 2012, always being 
used by roughly three times as many people as the next-most popular site (2).  
These people not only “use” the sites; most use them daily. 74% of Facebook users report 
using the site at least once a day, and two thirds of those report using it more than once a day. 
That amounts to over a third of Americans using Facebook “several times a day,” a figure that 
did not change significantly from 2016 to 2018 (4-5). The shares of Snapchat, Instagram, and 
Twitter users who use those sites daily are smaller than for Facebook, but still significant: 
roughly 60% for Snapchat and Instagram and 46% for Twitter (4).   
Additionally, Americans do not silo themselves onto only one of these platforms. Just shy 
of three-quarters of Americans use more than one platform, and the median American uses three 
(5). Lastly, although more people would find it “not hard to give up” social media than would 
find it “hard” (59% versus 40%), the share of users who would find it hard has grown over recent 
surveys, from 28% in January 2014 (6).  
All of this social media use is not purely for entertainment. Before the 2008 presidential 
election, political organizing and news-sharing over the most popular social media site, 
Facebook, was relatively scarce. Even with 500 million users worldwide in 2008, only four years 
removed from its launch, Facebook was still seen as little more than a social networking site 
used to share personal information and life updates. Woolley, Limperos, and Oliver (2010) argue 
that it was the 2008 election that saw social media transition from being “virtually unknown in 
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the realm of politics to a budding form of political communication” (632). Contemporary 
traditional media outlets and scholars alike were struck by the role of social media (namely, 
Facebook) in the election; Woolley, Limperos, and Oliver (2010) highlight one CNN headline 
that questioned “Will the 2008 presidential election be won on Facebook?” (632).   
Since 2008, receiving news content via social media has been on the rise. A 2017 Pew 
Research Center study found that two-thirds of Americans get at least some of their news on 
social media, with one in five Americans doing so “often” (Shearer & Gottfried 2017, 2). Much 
of this growth was driven by an increase in older, less-educated, and non-white Americans 
getting news from social media (2). For example, over half of Americans aged 50+ reported 
getting at least some of their news from social media sites for the first time since the question 
first asked in Pew surveys in 2013 (2, 14-15). For Americans under the age of 50, the share of 
people who got news via social media was over 75% (2).  
Any government has an intrinsic interest in knowing how information spreads though its 
society, and that interest is even stronger when the outcome in question (civic participation) is 
the foundation of the system of government. With over 90% of Americans online and consuming 
massive amounts of information each year, it is important to understand how that information 
might affect their decision to vote.  
Each successive development in media and information technology in the history of the 
United States has brought concerns about its impact on American civil society and civic life 
(Allcott & Gentzkow 2017). The era of “yellow journalism” is well documented as a period in 
which media sensationalism led to distinctly undesirable outcomes (Kaplan 2002). Radio and 
television led to their own unique problems, with critics (correctly) worrying that the platforms 
would cause a problematic distillation of information into “sound bites,” concentration of power 
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into the hands of large media companies, and increased national preference for more attractive, 
gregarious candidates (Lang & Lang 2002, Bagdikian 1983). The introduction of internet media 
brought the novel concern of echo chambers; when people are given a wide set of possible news 
sources to choose from, scholars were concerned that people would self-select into clusters of 
people already more like themselves (Sunstein 2007). Now, in the social media age, a new 
concern has arisen, in addition to the existing ones, which deals with the extent of the average 
person’s influence on others: most people can make and share content in the blink of eye, some 
with a similar reach to many traditional media sources just half a century ago (Morrell 2012; Gil 
de Zúñiga et al. 2014; Allcott & Gentzkow 2017). 
3. The 2016 Election 
The 2016 election was exceptional in many regards, and since November 2016, 
academics have worked to understand that election and the forces that shaped it. A plethora of 
perspectives on that election have been put forward, and the field of thought only continues to 
expand. Daniel Kreiss (of UNC’s Media and Journalism School) reviewed three books that lay 
out three of the leading perspectives on the 2016 election: that hackers (foreign and domestic) 
had great potential to set the national press agenda (Jamieson 2018); that changing 
demographics, a fractured Republican Party, and “explicit racial appeals” made by candidate 
Trump combined to radicalize the election and activate key voting blocs (Sides, Tesler, & 
Vavreck 2018); and that “Fake news entrepreneurs, Russians, the Facebook algorithm, and 
online echo chambers” led to a “crisis of disinformation and misinformation” primarily in the 
right media ecosystem (Benkler, Faris, & Roberts 2018, 11, 15). Benkler, Faris, and Roberts 
(2018) provide evidence of meaningful differences between left- and right-wing media 
ecosystems, finding that while both sides see “supply and demand of false partisan narratives,” 
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the left includes not only left-slanted media but centric media and slanted media that nonetheless 
adhere to journalistic norms, while the right-slanted “ecosystem is both more isolated from the 
center and there are few journalistic breaks on falsity” (Kreiss 2019, 3).  
One common thread through each of these perspectives is social media. Hackers, “fake 
news entrepreneurs,” foreign interests, and simple partisans populated echo chambers, which 
directly influenced social media users and also often served as source material for (mostly right-
wing) which picked up the content in a “propaganda feedback loop.” Social media also did not 
only benefit the non-traditional, populist candidate who ultimately won the US presidency, it 
also played a significant role in the achievements of an unsuccessful populist candidate (Bernie 
Sanders) in the Democratic primary (Groshek & Koc-Michalska 2017). The full extent of social 
media’s impact in 2016 continues and will continue to be hashed out, but it appears that there is 
consensus that it did have an important effect.  
Importantly, this thesis does not distinguish between “real” and “fake” news, one of the 
social media phenomena most-frequently discussed in relation to the 2016 election. The reason is 
simple – the data used in analysis provided no means to evaluate the veracity of information 
obtained through social media. Nonetheless, the “fake news” phenomenon – whether foreign 
governments, political partisans, or just internet “trolls” manipulated and polluted news content 
on social media – merits extended discussion in other work. The full extent to which this 
phenomenon influenced the 2016 election may never be known. One study by BuzzFeed news 
found that “the top-performing fake” news stories on Facebook in the four months preceding the 
election received more shares, reactions, and comments than the top-performing stories from 
mainstream news outlets (Silverman 2016). However, further analysis has called those findings 
into question (Rinehart 2017), illuminating how difficult it is to consider “fake news” with robust 
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methodology. As already mentioned, making the distinction between “real” and “fake” news is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, knowing the extent to which people’s voting is 
affected by any news they consume over social media – valuable for policymakers and social 
media providers in its own right – can also give insight to the possible extent of any effect of 
“fake” news that might have been consumed as part of that.  
4. Key Research Questions 
In a media environment where Americans can get news not only from television, the 
newspaper, or talk radio, but also across social media, where it may be more or less filtered, 
personalized, biased, or detailed, what effect does that news have on Americans’ likelihood to 
participate in the political process? And importantly, does getting news information from social 
media make people more knowledgeable about politics, which one would hope that people 
participating in the political process would be?  
Based on previous work in this field, the following hypotheses were formulated: 
H1: Consuming news through social media was positively related to voting in 2016.  
H2: The effect of social media news use on voting in 2016 was partially mediated by an  
        increase in political knowledge.  
H3: News-related social media use will have affected Democrats and Republicans 
       differently in 2016.  
Additionally, I formulated two further hypotheses dealing with questions of measurement – the 
reason for this consideration is explained in Chapter Two: 
H4: Measures of political knowledge which are limited only to actual attempted answers 
       will be subject to less bias on the basis of sex.  
H5: Measures of political knowledge which ask respondents about their own political 
       representation, rather than national political contexts, will be subject to less bias on  
       the basis of sex.  
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5. Thesis Roadmap 
This thesis is organized into four remaining chapters. In the next chapter, I examine past 
research, with a primary focus on uncovering potential confounding factors that affect two or 
more of: consumption of social media news content, political knowledge level, and likelihood to 
vote. I also review a few papers that have undertaken research questions similar to those posed 
by this thesis. In Chapter Three, I construct a causal diagram to explain the relationships between 
social media use, political knowledge, likelihood to vote, and the confounds uncovered in 
Chapter Two. Then, I introduce the data used, the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election 
Survey (CCES) Common Content. I review preprocessing steps taken and explain two 
exploratory factor analyses that were performed to obtain scores for social media use and 
political knowledge. Chapter Three concludes with the introduction of regression models, which 
apply the operationalized variables from the previous sections to the causal diagram from the 
beginning of the chapter. In Chapter Four, I present descriptive analysis of the variables used, 
followed by the results of the regression analyses. Finally, in Chapter 5, I summarize the findings 
of analysis and conclude by drawing wider conclusions.  
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Background 
In order to isolate the relationship between social media news use and voting, all 
plausible factors linking the two must be uncovered. After adding in political knowledge, all 
plausible factors linking it to either or both previous two must be explored as well. In this 
chapter, I undertake that exploration in three parts, documenting the predictors of each variable 
independently. At the end of the chapter, I review the literature that has previously investigated 
the places where those predictors overlap.  
1. Social Media Use 
 Previous scholarly work that attempts to predict social media use falls into three main 
categories: psychological, network-based, and demographic. Because the CCES does not contain 
any psychological or social-network questions, the literature in those two categories is of limited 
assistance to this thesis. Nonetheless, I briefly review the highest points of the psychological 
papers below and extract a few useful notes. Then, I review in greater depth the papers that 
examine social media use from a demographic perspective.  
 Psychologists generally agree that personality predicts a considerable amount of social 
media behavior (Moore & McElroy 2011; Correa, Hinsley, & Gil de Zúñiga 2010; Ross et al. 
2009). When discussing “personality,” contemporary psychologists frequently use the Five 
Factor Model to provide structure to their work, according to Moore and McElroy (2011, 268). 
The Five Factor Model delineates personality along five axes: extraversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to new experiences.  
However, other scholars, such as Khang, et al. (2014), explain social media use purely as 
a function of habit, rather than any other psychological motivator. Notably, Khang et al. (2014) 
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employ exploratory factor analysis to create social media scales, which supports the methods of 
this thesis. Nonetheless, habits must be formed, and Khang, et al. (2014) offer little to explain 
who develops social media use habits. The Five Factor personality model might explain how 
people enter into social media habits, but demographic factors may explain part of it as well. 
Scott et al. (2017), which is explored below as part of the category of papers using demographic 
predictors of social media, focuses in particular on the characteristics of those social media users 
who “habitually engage” (312).  
Moore & McElroy (2011) of the psychological category present one finding that is useful 
in establishing explanatory variables that will be included in this thesis: they find evidence that 
gender is a strong predictor of Facebook usage and content, and they suggest that it should be 
controlled for in future work (272). Demographically-focused papers that are cited below extend 
this effect from Facebook to all social media platforms.  
However, as stated before, the majority of the psychological school’s findings do not 
factor into this thesis. This is ultimately a constraint imposed by the observational design of this 
thesis; the CCES simply does not ask any questions that could be used to evaluate respondents’ 
personalities in any robust way. It does ask personal opinion questions, e.g. what the respondent 
thinks government priorities should be, but none would translate cleanly into psychological 
models. Additionally, demographic controls will not control for personality; the most predictive 
personality traits, primarily extraversion, have been found to be relatively randomly distributed 
among demographic groups (Goldberg, et al. 1998, 399). Ultimately, differences in personality 
must be left in residuals in this thesis’ analysis.  
The more-relevant class of papers that attempt to explain patterns in social media use are 
those that do so using demographic factors like age, education, gender, race, and so on (Scott et 
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al. 2017, Duggan & Brenner 2013, Lenhart, et al. 2010). This thesis relies mostly on the work of 
Scott et al. (2017), which attempted to create profiles of social media users among “emerging 
adults,” people aged 18-26. Their work contributes several explanatory variables for social media 
use, as well as introduces a framework for considering “active” social media use, a distinction 
similar to the consumption versus active engagement dynamic in question in this thesis.  
In their methods, Scott et al. (2017) distinguish between two dimensions of social media 
use: frequency and engagement (312). “Frequency,” which according to Scott et al. (2017) is the 
focus of “the vast majority” of previous studies in the field, entails minutes of use, frequency 
counts of checking feeds, and so on. “Engagement,” on the other hand, entails responding to 
other users, (re)posting content, and filtering content by blocking, unfriending, or unfollowing. 
This “participative,” habitual engagement through social media is the active social media 
behavior that this thesis uses to distinguishes from basic social media news consumption. 
In their results, Scott et al. (2017) find that gender, race, and education are all statistically 
significant predictors of social media use, though their effects are split between frequency and 
engagement (316, Tables 5-6). Scott et al. (2017) find that women make up a statistically-
significantly greater portion of high-frequency users than low-frequency users, but find that – 
among people who log on at roughly equal frequencies – gender did not affect the extent to 
which they engaged with content by interacting with other users, posting, and so on. However, 
Scott et al. (2017) did find that engagement was associated with both race and education, with 
highly-engaged users tending to be white and more highly-educated.  
Scott et al. (2017) found income and age to be statistically insignificant (316). However, 
Scott et al.’s (2017) findings regarding income and age should be taken with a grain of salt, as 
their sample consists of people aged only 18-26. Both age and income will vary far more in an 
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age-unlimited sample than in a sample limited to people in early young adulthood. Therefore, 
both age and income could very possibly be significant predictors of social media use in the 
wider American public even though Scott et al.’s (2017) findings suggest otherwise.  
Evidence to that fact is provided by multiple surveys conducted by the Pew Research 
Center. Smith and Anderson (2018) find “substantial differences in social media use by age” (3). 
Specifically, they find that social media use and age are negatively related: the older someone is, 
the less likely they are to use social media. 88% of those aged 18-29 use some form of social 
media, compared to 78% among 30 to 49 year-olds, 64% among 50 to 64 year-olds, and 37% 
among those aged 65 and over. Shearer and Gottfried (2018) find that 45% of American adults 
over the age of 50 got news from social media sites in a survey conducted in 2016, while 78% of 
Americans ages 18-49 got news from social media. Shearer and Gottfried’s (2018) findings also 
support education as a predictor of social media news use: 60% of Americans with some college 
experience or less education reported getting news from social media sites in that same survey, 
compared to 68% of college graduates and higher who reported doing so. 
2. Political Knowledge 
The next set of predictors that must be identified are those of political knowledge levels. 
First, however, a distinction must be made about to what the term “political knowledge” refers. 
Scholars have employed myriad measures for political knowledge. Most of them are based on 
surveys, but there is significant variation in the types of questions asked (Pew 2018b, Freiling 
2017, APPC 2014). Political knowledge survey questions can be grouped into three main 
families: identification questions (Pew 2018b, Freiling 2017, APPC 2014), civic questions (Pew 
2018b, APPC 2014), and factual questions (Pew 2007). The most common are identification and 
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civic questions; those are explored in greater detail below. Factual questions are less common, 
perhaps due to their limited “staying” power. For example, the 2007 Pew survey asked 
respondents to estimate the number of U.S. troops who had been killed in Iraq at the time1 and to 
identify the subject country of “many recent news stories about tainted food and dangerous 
toys2” (6-8). Such questions are useful for evaluating knowledge of “hot topics,” but because hot 
topics by definition come and go, using them to evaluate trends is, relatively, more difficult than 
identification and civic knowledge, whose questions remain essentially constant. 
Civic questions ask respondents about structures, rules, and history of American 
government. For example, a 2018 Pew survey categorized respondents as having either “High,” 
“Medium,” or “Low” civic knowledge based on their answers to four questions: who breaks tied 
votes in the U.S. Senate, how many votes are needed to end a filibuster in the Senate, which 
amendment to the Constitution sets presidential term limits, and what the Electoral College is 
(Pew 2018b, 117). A 2014 survey by the Annenberg Public Policy Center (APPC) asked similar 
questions, such as the vote threshold for presidential veto overrides, the names of the three 
branches of federal government, and the degree of federal and legislative oversight over the 
Supreme Court (APPC 2014, 1). Performance on these questions varies. Around a third of 
Americans could name all three branches of government in the 2014 APPC survey, but also 
around a third could not name even one (1). Only a quarter of Americans knew that two-thirds of 
both the House and Senate must vote to override a presidential veto (1). On the Pew survey, only 
23% of Americans answered all four questions correctly; 44% answered two to three questions 
correctly, and 32% were correct on one or none (Pew 2018b, 117).  
                                                            
1 Around 3,500 
2 China 
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Identification questions ask more contemporary questions about the state of politics: for 
example, can the respondent correctly identify which party is in control of a given legislative 
body? Brennan cites such a statistic in his book, claiming that “citizens generally don’t know 
which party controls Congress” (Chapter 2, 2). Numerous surveys put this claim to the test, and 
the results are mixed. The 2014 APPC survey supported Brennan’s claim, finding that 38% of 
Americans correctly identified the party in control of the House3 at the time; the same percent 
did so for the Senate4,5 (APPC 2014, 2). A 2018 Pew Research Center study contradicted 
Brennan’s claim, however: 82% of its survey respondents correctly identified the Republican 
majority in the House and 83% identified the Republican majority in the Senate. 75% correctly 
identified both (Pew 2018b, 108). There are many potential explanations for this difference, 
including difference in time frame (2014 vs. 2018) or sampling bias. It is unlikely for such a 
large difference to be the result of change over time, but the changed nature of politics after the 
2016 election may contribute to the difference.  
When asked to identify the party of their personal Representative in Congress, Americans 
typically answer correctly about half the time. A 2017 study found that 56% of respondents 
claimed to know the party of their district’s current member of Congress (Freiling 2017). It is 
worth noting that their claim was not validated; the 56% figure represents claims of knowledge, 
not verifiable knowledge. Therefore, those figures should be taken with a grain of salt. 
When it comes to predictors of political knowledge, Brennan uses identification-type 
questions (as opposed to civic or factual questions). He identifies eight specific axes along which 
                                                            
3 The Republicans 
4 The Democrats 
5 For both chambers, over 40% of respondents did not even guess, saying they did not know. That figure was up 
from just over 25% in 2011 (APPC 2014, 2). 
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such political knowledge varies, which are summarized in Table 1 below. According to his 
findings, political knowledge is significantly associated with many fundamental demographic 
factors, ranging from the relatively more-malleable, e.g. education and geographic region, to the 
immutable, e.g. age and race.  
Table 1: Determinants of Political Knowledge 
Characteristic Knowledge Positively Correlated With… 
Knowledge Negatively Correlated 
With… 
Education Having a college degree  Having a H.S. diploma or less 
Income 
Earning above-average income; 
also being in top 25% of income 
earners 
Earning below-average income; 
also being in the bottom 25% of 
income earners 
Region of the US Living in the West Living in the South 
Partisanship Being or leaning Republican Being a Democrat or leaning Independent 
Age Being middle-aged (35-54) Being any other age 
Race - Being black 
Gender - Being female 
SOURCE: Brennan “Against Democracy” 2016, Chapter 2, Page 7 
 
A 2018 Pew Research Center survey supports several of Brennan’s claims (Pew 2018b, 
110). It found a positive, linear relationship between educational attainment and “civic 
knowledge,” suggesting that someone with a postgraduate degree is almost four times more 
likely to have “high” civic knowledge than someone with a high school diploma or less. It also 
found that age was associated with civic knowledge, though it observed a positive, linear 
relationship in contrast to the parametric relationship posited by Brennan (108).  
That Pew survey also makes several findings that are in total contrast to Brennan’s 
findings. For example, the Pew survey found “no major differences” in civic knowledge by party 
identification (110). Almost exactly the same percent of Democrats were found to have high 
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civic knowledge as Republicans; the same was true for having medium civic knowledge, as well 
as low (109). Instead, it found that the respondent’s ideology was a significant predictor. People 
who identified farther from the center within their party were more likely to have high civic 
knowledge (e.g., conservative Republicans were more knowledgeable than moderate or liberal 
Republicans) (110). 
An important note must be made regarding common measures for political knowledge. 
First, in his book, Brennan raises concerns about the fundamental accuracy of approximations of 
people’s knowledge levels – not only self-reported ones like in Freiling (2017), but also 
calculated ones like those used in Pew (2018b) and this thesis. Naturally, people may simply be 
wrong about knowing something, as is the concern in Freiling (2017). More critically, on 
calculated political knowledge measures, such as whether someone correctly identifies the party 
in control of a legislative chamber, some error can be introduced due to guessing; there is some 
non-zero, relatively significant change that someone simply guessed the correct answer (Brennan 
2016, chapter 2, page 3). This is of concern for this thesis, as the political knowledge measure 
that was used in analysis is a calculated political awareness measure.  
 The second note is an extension of Brennan’s concern about people’s ability to guess on 
political knowledge questions: multiple scholars have found a distinct gendered difference in 
likelihood of such guessing on political knowledge questions (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996, 
Verba, Burns, & Schlozman 1997, Lizotte & Sidman 2009, Kenski 2006, Miller 2018). Men 
have been found to be more likely to guess on political knowledge questions, while women are 
more likely not to attempt the question if they don’t know the answer, instead responding “Don’t 
Know” or “Not Sure” – if given the option. Lizotte and Sidman (2009) found that controlling for 
men’s higher likelihood to guess reduces the knowledge gender gap by around 36%. That effect 
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has been found to persist even after controlling for factors such as age, race, education, income, 
political engagement, and employment (Garand, Cuynan, & Fournet 2004).  
One explanation for this persistent effect has been the nature of questions asked. Many 
authors have found that broad questions about “national-level politics and the rules of the game” 
favor men (Miller 2018, 177). In a 2011 paper, Kathleen Dolan finds that asking gender-relevant 
questions about politics, e.g. the percent of women in Congress, leads the long-reported gender 
differences in political knowledge to essentially “disappear.” Other topics on which women tend 
to perform equally with or better than men include identifying candidate positions on abortion 
and naming the head of the local school board (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996, Shaker 2012).  
Miller (2018) references literature providing two theoretical explanations for women’s 
lower performance on national, institutional questions but higher performance on gender-
relevant or local questions. First, Dolan (2011) found that people are more likely to pay attention 
to politicians who are descriptively more like them – and because there are far fewer women in 
national public office than men, women may pay less attention to national politicians, because 
they relate to them less. Second, Stolle and Gidengil (2010) found that women benefit more 
frequently from government services and are employed in government more frequently than 
men, yet questions gauging knowledge of government services are almost never included in 
traditional political knowledge questionnaires.  
Unfortunately, there are no gender-relevant questions of the type described by Dolan 
(2011) in the CCES. However, one subset of political knowledge questions in the CCES may be 
less gender-biased than the other, bigger-picture questions: the CCES includes four questions 
that ask respondents to identify their own personal representatives in government, rather than 
identify large, national balances of power. Miller (2018) offers some theoretical foundation to 
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expect that these questions may be less gender-biased. Her research finds that there is no 
statistical difference between the rate at which men and women correctly identify the majority 
party in the respondent’s home state (Table 3) – a more local identification, like the four personal 
representation identification questions. This topic is further explored in Chapters Three and Four 
when this thesis’ specific knowledge measures are created and explored in descriptive analysis. 
Fortin-Rittberger (2016) offers an additional step that can be taken to account for some of 
the gender bias in survey-response based political knowledge scores; her findings suggest that 
calculating scores as a proportion of correct responses out of only valid responses removes a 
nontrivial amount of the gender difference in political knowledge (Table 2). Considering 
respondents’ accuracy only if they affirmatively answer removes a substantial amount of 
gender’s effect on knowledge, by accounting for the gendered difference in likelihood of 
guessing versus abstaining from answering (393). Such a metric will be used in this thesis’ 
analysis. Nonetheless, gender will still be controlled for, because of its effects on social media 
and on voting, as well as because traditional-type political knowledge questions must be used. 
3. Political Participation 
The final set of predictors to identify are those of the outcome: voting. This section relies 
mostly upon the work of the MIT Election Data and Science Lab, which used data from the 
United States Election Project and the Census Bureau to calculate nationwide 2016 voter turnout 
by demographic groups. Their analysis begins by touching on over-reporting bias in survey-
based voter turnout rates, which is addressed in this thesis as well, in Chapter Three.  
Then, the MIT lab provides subpopulation means of voter turnout for education, income, 
age, marital status, sex, and race/ethnicity. Nationwide, the MIT lab estimates that 77% of people 
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with more than a high school degree voted in 2016, while only 44% of people with a high school 
degree or less did. Another wide gap is found when stratifying by income: people in families 
with income of more than $50,000 were 69% likely to vote, while people in families with income 
of less than $50,000 were 50% likely to vote. Age also was a significant predictor of voter 
turnout; those aged 60+ voted at a rate of 72%, while those aged 31 to 60 voted 62% of the time 
and those aged 18 to 30 voted only 44% of the time. Married people voted 18 percentage points 
more frequently than unmarried people (69% versus 51%) and women voted five percentage 
points more frequently than men (63% versus 58%). Finally, white people were the most likely 
racial/ethnic category to vote, at 65%, followed by black people at 60%. Hispanic, Asian-
American, and “all other” people voted at roughly 46%. All these turnout rates also varied by 
state. I speak in more detail about state-by-state turnout in Section 2.A below, but speaking 
generally, state turnout rates in 2016 ranged from 42% to 74%, with a mean of 61% and a 
standard deviation of 6%.  
4. Putting It All Together 
The three previous sections have reviewed literature that describes the individual 
predictors of each of the three larger concepts at hand in this thesis: social media (news) use, 
political knowledge, and political participation. This section reviews the existing literature that 
has connected two or more of those. Much of that work comes, in one way or another, from 
Homero Gil de Zúñiga of the University of Vienna. After reviewing that literature, the chapter 
concludes with a summary table of potentially confounding variables in analysis.  
Going back to the mid-2000s, not too long after the introduction of Web 2.0, two papers 
looked at the effect of informational internet use on political knowledge and participation. Both 
papers found that engaging with political content online impacted both knowledge and 
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participation. Kenski and Stroud (2006) found that internet access and exposure to online 
political content were statistically significant, though substantively limited, predictors of political 
knowledge and participation. In addition, they found that sex, age, race, education, income, and 
partisanship – both direction and strength – were predictors of both outcomes (knowledge and 
participation) (Table 3). 
Shah, Cho, Eveland, and Kwak (2005) looked at information seeking, which is slightly 
different from Kenski and Stroud’s exposure. Additionally, while Kenski and Stroud (2006) 
control for gender, race, education, and income, Shah et al. (2005) do not use any demographic 
controls in their models. Shah, et al. developed three types of structural equation models, one 
cross-sectional, one with fixed effects, and one auto-regressive. Because this thesis does not deal 
with panel data, the cross-sectional model is most comparable and will be the most discussed, 
though the patterns in Shah et al.’s findings do not differ greatly among the three models (551).  
In their model, Shah et al. measure three types of information seeking: searching online, 
reading the newspaper, and watching TV. They also qualify two types of political expression: 
“interpersonal political discussion,” i.e. talking about politics with friends, family, neighbors, 
coworkers, etc., and “interactive civic messaging,” e.g. emailing a politician or writing a letter to 
the editor (541). Finally, they measure civic participation as self-reported frequency of 
volunteering, working on community projects, attending community meetings, or doing 
otherwise charitable work (540).  
In the cross-sectional model, online information seeking was found to strongly, positively 
predict both types of political expression (545-546). In turn, both types of political expression 
were found to positively predict civic participation. However, they also note that when all paths 
are held open, i.e. for all three information seeking types (online, newspaper, TV), only reading 
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the newspaper is found to have a direct effect on civic participation (546). Nonetheless, the 
indirect effect of online information seeking on civic participation through the two types of 
political expression remains.  
The model structure and findings of Shah et al.’s paper are both very informative for this 
thesis. Nevertheless, the connections are not perfectly lined up. Given the time-frame of the 
paper’s analysis, the 2000 election, the types of online activity measured here are starkly 
different from the online social media news use at hand in this thesis. In 2000, if people wanted 
information about politics, they truly had to seek it out, which is why Shah et al. term it 
“information-seeking” in their paper. That type of behavior is also fairly similar to reading the 
newspaper, which requires a conscious choice to obtain the information and then be able to read 
it. The same could be said of watching TV news, though the comparison is less strong. 
The social media news use that is being studied in this thesis requires not nearly as much 
“seeking-out” of the information. People may encounter news items on their social media feeds 
because they follow an outlet’s page, because a personal connection shared it, or even because it 
was advertised. The amount of effort required to encounter news on social media in 2016 was 
very different from the threshold set in Shah et al.’s analysis. 
Additionally, the civic participation outcomes in Shah et al.’s paper are truly “civic,” 
rather than political – i.e., Shah, et al. do not look at voting. Rather, they look at more localized 
community engagement, like going to meetings and volunteering for nonprofits.  
Fast-forwarding seven years to Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, and Valenzuela (2012) (“GZJV”) 
finds a paper that takes voting into account as one of many civic participation outcomes. GZJV 
considers the effect of getting news from social media on four outcomes: social capital, civic 
participation, offline political participation, and online political participation. Social capital is 
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defined as “resources that can be accessed or mobilized through ties in [one’s social] network” 
(Lin 2008, 51). Online political participation in GZJV (2012) includes making donations, 
emailing politicians, and subscribing to a political listserv (324). The remaining two outcomes 
split the civic behaviors used as outcomes in Shah et al. (2005) above: GZJV’s (2012) “civic 
participation” outcome includes raising charitable moneys, attending neighborhood meetings, 
and being a conscious consumer, and their “offline political participation” outcome includes 
voting, putting up signs, and attending a rally (324).   
Informing the methodology of this thesis, GZJV (2012) perform four sets of hierarchical 
regression analyses, one for each set of outcomes. They find that  
after controlling for demographic variables, traditional media use offline and online, 
political constructs (knowledge and efficacy), and frequency and size of political 
discussion networks, seeking information via social network sites is a positive and 
significant predictor of people’s social capital and civic and political participatory 
behaviors, online and offline. (319) 
Specifically, they find that getting news from social media was a statistically significant 
predictor of offline political participation at the p < 0.001 level. Additionally, GZJV (2012) find 
that age, education, and getting news from non-social media sources are all also statistically 
significant predictors of offline political participation. 
 Gil de Zúñiga was an author on another paper that bears heavily on this thesis; Jung, 
Kim, and Gil de Zúñiga (2011) found that political knowledge acts as a strong mediator of news 
media use’s effect on offline political participation. However, they found that news exposure has 
only a limited direct effect on political knowledge (almost all of which is mediated). The authors 
conclude that simple exposure to information may not lead to much political learning, and that 
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more intense processing of information may be required for knowledge to be gained. That fact 
notwithstanding, the effect was still non-trivial, which supports the focus of this thesis. 
 Jung, Kim, and Gil de Zúñiga (2011) offer a few additional helpful findings for this 
thesis. They confirmed the causal order of news use  political knowledge  voting, by 
running their model with each possible ordering of variables (421). They also hypothesized that 
“attitude strength” might be a confound that was not included in their analysis (424), which 
informs the use of party ID and ideology as confounds in this thesis.  
Lastly, the measure used for political knowledge by Jung, Kim, and Gil de Zúñiga (2011) 
dealt with only “general” political knowledge – who is the current Speaker of the House, who is 
the current British Prime Minister, which state is Sarah Palin the governor of, and so on (418). In 
light of the discussion in the Political Knowledge section above, this measure may be 
problematic for several reasons. In their conclusions, the authors note that other types of 
knowledge should also be investigated, including candidates’ issue stance knowledge, which 
“may be more relevant than general political knowledge in an election context” (425). As will be 
seen in Chapter Three, this thesis uses two measures of knowledge in analysis: “General” and 
“Personal.” While both types ask respondents to identify the party of something (a legislative 
chamber or an elected official, respectively), knowledge of one’s own representatives in 
government (“PersonalKnowledge”) represents a slightly different dimension of political 
knowledge than the general identification questions used in Jung, Kim, and Gil de Zúñiga 
(2011). It may also be less subject to the widely-reported on gender bias in national and 
institutional rule-based knowledge questions, which are the type used in Jung, Kim, and Gil de 
Zúñiga (2011). Additionally, Jung, Kim, and Gil de Zúñiga (2011) calculate their knowledge 
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measure as a simple sum of correct answers (418), in contrast to this thesis, which calculates 
knowledge as the proportion of correct answers out of attempted answers.  
One variable that was used in Jung, Kim, and Gil de Zúñiga (2011) that is not in this 
thesis is internal political efficacy. The authors found that, in addition to political knowledge, 
internal political efficacy was found to be a strong mediator of the relationship between news use 
and political participation. In other words, based on the authors’ findings, getting news from 
social media makes people feel more capable of influencing the political process, which leads 
them to do so (422). The CCES contains no variables that could be used to approximate political 
efficacy, so unfortunately, it was not considered in analysis. 
 Finally, another paper co-authored by Homero Gil de Zúñiga investigates the distinction 
between news consumption and active engagement. Weeks, Ardèvol-Abreu, & Gil de Zúñiga 
(2017) use the terms “opinion leaders” and “prosumers” to refer to people in their study who 
actively commented on, forwarded, or created news content on social media. The study focused 
on those people’s self-perceptions and whether seeing oneself as an “opinion leader” makes one 
more likely to try to influence others’ politics. They found that people who are more actively 
engaged with politics on social media do have outsized effects on other people’s political 
attitudes and behavior, which grants policy relevance to RQ2 (15). That influence was corro-
borated by Turcotte et al. (2015), which found that people trusted a news story’s source more 
when they believed the story had been posted by one of their real-life Facebook friends. The 
effect was even greater when the participant perceived the friend as an opinion leader.  
 In summary, the existing literature that has been reviewed here grants legitimacy to both 
main research questions posed at the end of Chapter One. The literature also supports the 
research methods that will be laid out in the next chapter, particularly by establishing a set of 
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control variables that should be included in regression analysis. For clarity, I have summarized 
this chapter’s findings regarding control variables in Table 2 below, which indicates which of 
the three main variables (social media use, political knowledge, and voting) each potential 
confound is related to, and which sources in the literature provide evidence of that relationship. 
 In addition to giving legitimacy to the methods of this thesis in those parts held common, 
some of the literature cited in this chapter shows the novelty of the methods of this thesis. First 
and foremost, no paper has looked at social media news use, political knowledge, and voting in 
the specific context of the 2016 election. Given the nature of that election, there is ample reason 
to believe that people may have had a different relationship to social media than in previous 
political contexts. Additionally, the knowledge measure used in this thesis differs from that used 
in previous work and may be less gender-biased than knowledge measures used in previous work 
relating social media news use, knowledge, and voting.  
Table 2: Summary of Potential Confounding Variables 
Characteristic Using Social Media Political Knowledge Likelihood of Voting 
Education 1,2,7 5,6,11 7,8,11 
Income 1,10 5,11 8,10,11 
Region of the US  5  
Political Attitudes 10 6,10,11 10,11 
Age 2,3,7,10 5,6,11 7,8,10,11 
Race 1,2 5,11 8,11 
Gender 1,4 5,9,11 8,11 
Marital Status   8 
Other News Use 7 7 7 
State of Residence  5  
1: Scott et al. (2017), 2: Shearer & Gottfried (2018), 3: Smith & Anderson (2018), 4: Moore & 
McElroy (2011), 5: Brennan (2016), 6: Pew (2018b), 7: Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, and Valenzuela 
(2012), 8: MIT Election Data & Science Lab, 9: Dolan (2011), 10: Weeks, Ardèvol-Abreu, & 
Gil de Zúñiga (2017), 11: Kenski & Stroud (2006) 
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Methods 
Drawing on the theoretical foundations established in the previous chapter, this chapter 
establishes statistical models that might provide answers to the two research questions of this 
thesis. The chapter begins by building a causal diagram to relate social media news use, political 
knowledge, and voting, using the potential confounding variables uncovered in the previous 
chapter. Then, an overview of the data source is provided, and some of its strengths and 
limitations are discussed. Next, variables are operationalized, which includes two exploratory 
factor analyses. Finally, the operationalized variables are combined with the causal diagrams to 
construct two sets of regression analyses. 
1. Causal Diagram 
Based on the predicted confounding variables identified in Chapter Two and summarized 
in Table 2 above, a causal diagram relating social media news content, political knowledge, and 
likelihood of voting was constructed. That diagram is included as Figure 1 below. Any 
characteristic that, based on the literature, was expected to influence two or more of the main 
variables was included as a potential confound in the graph.  
Figure 1 is an example of a Directed Acyclic Graph or “DAG,” and was made with 
DAGitty, a web-based tool for creating DAGs (Textor, et al. 2016). A DAG represents each 
variable in consideration as a node, with arrows connecting any two variables that are correlated. 
The direction of the arrow represents the direction of causality; so, for instance, the arrow from 
Age  Voting represents a direct causal path from age to voting, signifying that age has a direct 
effect on voting.  
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It should be noted that there are many relationships between the confounding variables 
that have not been included in this diagram, for clarity. For example, age, sex, and race, are all 
strong predictors of both education and income, and education and income are themselves related 
as well. If one or more confounding variables did not have a direct effect on the outcome, i.e. did 
not have an arrow drawn from itself to voting, it would be necessary to chart each of these 
relationships in order to find and close the correct biasing pathways using Pearl’s backdoor 
criterion (Pearl 1998, 255-259). However, each confounding variable has, based on the literature, 
a direct effect on both the treatment and the outcome. Therefore, all confounding variables that 
can be controlled for will have to be controlled for, making their inter-relationships, for charting 
purposes, moot.  
Additionally, it should be noted that there are some predicted confounds in this 
relationship which cannot be controlled for – most importantly personality. Also omitted from 
this diagram are predictors which have not been theorized to be confounds – those variables from 
Table 2 above which are theorized to affect only one of: treatment, mediator, and outcome. 
Figure 1: The Mediated Relationship Between Social Media News Consumption and Voting 
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2. The 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) 
 As mentioned previously, this thesis uses data from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional 
Election Survey (CCES). The CCES is unique among political surveys for several reasons. Chief 
among them for this thesis is that it asks respondents about their active online news-related 
activity – whether they read or watch political news content, share political information, put their 
own opinions out online, and so on. Other surveys, such as the American National Election 
Survey and ones conducted by the Pew Research Center, are superior on more traditional 
questions of media literacy (i.e. access to, frequency of, and attitude towards internet use), but do 
not include questions relating to active engagement with political news material.  
The CCES is a national project, the collaborative product of sixty teams across the 
country. In 2016, each team surveyed roughly 1,000 people in two waves, pre-election 
(September 28 to November 7, 2016) and post-election (November 9 to December 14, 2016). 
Survey respondents were asked questions from three pools, which constitute three tiers of 
content: Common Content, Group Content, and Team Content. Teams and groups of teams have 
access to their unique content, while the Common Content is made publicly available through the 
Harvard Dataverse (Ansolabehere & Schaffner 2017). The Common Content data are the source 
for this thesis, and they include basic sample identifiers, including weights; demographic 
information, including ideology and voter registration status; pre-election questions; post-
election questions, including vote-validation data; and contextual data, including candidate and 
incumbent information.  
Survey responses were collected through YouGov, an online membership-based service 
that pairs respondents with researchers. Survey participation is voluntary and requires 
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understanding of YouGov’s privacy policy, which includes anonymization of any individual data 
provided to clients, such as the researchers behind the CCES (YouGov.com).  
To gather the sample, YouGov used a matched random sample methodology for data 
collection. This method matches individuals in a sampling frame to a researcher-provided target 
population, using the same theoretical foundations as stratified sampling. First, both the target 
population and YouGov’s member base are broken into the same mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive strata. For the 2016 CCES, over 150,000 YouGov members were pooled to construct 
these strata. Potential respondents were then recruited out of each YouGov stratum through 
simple random sampling until the proportion of each sample stratum within the total sample 
population matched its equivalent’s frequency in the target population (Ansolabehere, Schaffner, 
& Luks 2017, 12). The sample for the 2016 CCES was later limited again to those respondents 
who completed both the pre- and post-election waves of questions, after which point weights 
were applied. The final product is a nationally-representative sample of 64,600 respondents. 
YouGov’s online sampling methodology is advantageous because of the large sample 
size it makes possible. This large sample size enables, among other things, state-level validation 
of the CCES sample, by comparing CCES two-party vote share predictions to actual state-level 
results. Graphs comparing the CCES estimate and actual two-party vote share in the presidential, 
senate, gubernatorial, attorneys general, and secretaries of state elections are included on pages 
seventeen to twenty-one of the 2016 CCES guidebook. They show that CCES estimates are a 
very good approximation of actual electoral outcomes, with over 95% confidence of a match 
between estimate and actual outcome in most cases (Ansolabehere, Schaffner, & Luks 2017, 17).   
The main drawback of CCES data is YouGov’s digital sample frame. All survey 
participants necessarily have at least some experience using digital technology and the internet, 
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meaning the sample is likely to be biased towards people who use social media. The primary 
authors of the CCES acknowledge this limitation in CCES documentation when enumerating 
assumptions necessary to confirm the representativeness of the CCES sample (Ansolabehere, 
Schaffner, & Luks 2017, 12-13). Specifically, they reiterate the “common support” assumption, 
which holds that the range of values in variables used for sample matching must be plausibly the 
same for people included in the survey sample as for people not included in the sample frame. 
Because the survey is executed via computer, this excludes any variable measuring computer use 
from being a matching variable, because there cannot be anyone in the survey sample who never 
uses a computer. Because of that fact, it cannot be said with certainty that the survey sample and 
the target population (the US population, in this case) are the same on such metrics. However, 
there is nothing that can be done quantitatively to correct for this, and it can only be noted as a 
limitation. 
2 A. Vote Validation in the CCES 
A second problem spot – to avoid calling it a limitation – in the CCES is vote validation. 
Several research teams have independently identified discrepancies relating to validated vote 
calculations that can be performed using the CCES (Grimmer, et al. 2017; Agadjanian 2018a; 
Agadjanian 2018b; Ansolabehere & Hersh 2012). The problem is not limited to just the CCES, 
though; most surveys dealing with voting behavior consistently over-estimate voter turnout rates 
(Cuevas-Molina 2017, 1). Political scientists have postulated several explanations for this, 
including sample selection bias, a social-desirability effect, and a combination of the two 
(Ansolabehere & Hersh 2012, 439-441). Sample selection likely contributes at least some of the 
observed upward bias, as people who opt in to a survey about politics are more likely to care 
about and participate in politics. Social desirability also likely contributes to the observed bias; 
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there is a societal norm of voting, and people are reluctant to admit to not having done so, even 
in anonymous survey interviews. These may not only independently bias surveys’ voter turnout 
metrics, but also interact, according to Bernstein, Chaha, and Montjoy (2001), who predict that 
“people who are under the most pressure to vote are the ones most likely to misrepresent their 
behavior when they fail to do so” (24). If people have self-selected into a political survey and 
therefore care more about politics, but for whatever reason(s) did or could not vote, they may be 
even more likely to make false claims than someone to whom politics is less important.  
Whatever its causes, the effect is “non-trivial” in essentially all national surveys that deal 
with voting, and must be addressed (Cuevas-Molina 2017, 1). To do so, survey makers now use 
publicly-available voter registration records and privately-sold voter lists in order to validate 
people’s reported voting behavior. Before releasing a data set, teams can match as many survey 
respondents to official voter records as possible, in order to confirm or contradict their self-
reported voter registration status and voting history (Ansolabehere & Hersh 2012, 437). More 
than roughly ten years ago, researchers were limited in the extent to which they could do this, 
given irregularities in availability and quality of data. The CCES was the first project to perform 
fifty-state vote validation, in 2012 (439). Historically, even after performing vote validation, the 
CCES still overestimates voter turnout; Agadjanian (2018b) shows that the CCES overestimated 
national voter turnout in 2012 and 2014 by 6 and 14 points, respectively. These calculations were 
performed using CCES’ validated turnout and voting-eligible for highest office turnout from the 
United States Election Project (Agadjanian 2018b; data available through McDonald n.d.).  
The authors of the 2016 CCES suggest three ways to incorporate vote validation into 
analysis, in order to approve the accuracy of voter turnout (Ansolabehere, Schaffner, & Luks 
2017, 126). One additional option not included in those three is to forgo vote validation 
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altogether; whether someone says they voted is a decent indicator of political interest and using 
such a measure avoids the risk of creating false-negatives. However, doing so would also 
hamstring any causal claims that might be made; any findings would not relate to a person’s 
actual likelihood of voting, but rather only to their likelihood of saying they voted.  
Because of that limitation, it was decided that this thesis would use a validated vote 
measure. Therefore, a choice had to be made between the three validated vote measures outlined 
by the CCES authors. Those measures make use of information made available by a 
collaboration between the CCES team and Catalist, a political data firm. Researchers compared 
2016 CCES respondents to a national database of registered voters prepared by Catalist, which 
resulted in 45,117 (69.84%) of those who completed both waves of the CCES survey being 
matched to a state’s voter file. 19,483 (30.16%) were not.  
The three vote validation measures suggested by the CCES authors are explained in more 
detail in Table 3. The first method, VV1, maintains the largest sample size, by making a non-
voter out of anyone who was not affirmatively matched as a registered 2016 voter. This method 
relies on the accuracy of both government voter file data and CCES survey responses for 
matching, making its definition of non-voters the least rigorous. While this will unfortunately 
result in some false-negatives, the CCES authors point out that the most common reason that 
respondents couldn’t be matched was that they were in fact not registered to vote; rates of self-
reported non-registration/non-voting were “much higher” among those not matched to a voter 
file than among those matched (Ansolabehere, Schaffner, & Luks 2017, 126). 
The second method, VV2, makes classifications only for respondents who could be 
matched to a voter registration; anyone not matched is left missing. This reduces the sample size 
Roberson 34 
 
significantly (dropping 30% of the original data set), though it has the benefit of reduced 
likelihood of false negatives.  
Finally, while VV1 and VV2 employed in their classifications only the variables for 
being matched to a voter registration and for having cast a verified 2016 vote, VV3 also employs 
self-reported registration and voting behavior. Among respondents who could not be matched to 
a voter file, VV3 takes self-reported non-registered and/or non-voting people at their word. The 
CCES authors justify this assumption on the grounds that “self-reported non-voters are honest 
about their non-participation because there is no incentive to go against the democratic norm of 
participation” (126 – emphasis added).  
Table 3: Defining Three Validated Voter-Turnout Measures 
Measure Voters Non-Voters Treated as Missing 
VV1 
*Matched to voter  
  registration and vote  
  confirmed as cast 
*Matched to voter  
  registration and vote  
  confirmed as not-cast 
*Not matched to any  
  voter registration 
None 
VV2 
*Matched to voter  
  registration and vote  
  confirmed as cast 
*Matched to voter  
  registration and vote  
  confirmed as not-cast 
*Not matched to any  
  voter registration 
VV3 
*Matched to voter  
  registration and vote  
  confirmed as cast 
*Matched to voter  
  registration and vote  
  confirmed as not-cast 
*Not matched to any  
  voter registration and  
  self-reported not being  
  registered to vote 
*Not matched to any  
  voter registration and  
  self-reported not  
  casting a vote 
*Not matched to any  
  voter registration and  
  self-reported not  
  having cast a vote 
SOURCE: Adapted from Ansolabehere, Schaffner, & Luks 2017, 126 
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Each validation method has its advantages and disadvantages, with none being clearly 
strictly-dominated or dominant on qualitative considerations. Empirics help to decide which 
measure to use in analysis. Table 4 compares state-level CCES predicted turnout using each of 
the three measures to actual turnout. Comparisons are made to two different statistics for “actual 
turnout” from the United States Election Project: turnout among the voting-age population 
(VAP) and among the voting-eligible population (VEP).  
Both the VAP and VEP comparisons are included, for separate purposes: Alexander 
Agadjanian (2018b) used the VEP in his comparisons, but VAP turnout is a better analogue for 
some estimates of CCES turnout, when respondents are not limited to eligible voters. Whether 
the CCES sample is more like the voting eligible or voting age population changes depending on 
the VV method used. When using VV1, the sample is more similar to the VAP, because non-
matched respondents are considered simply non-voters, rather than excluded as missing; voting 
non-eligible people are still included as the sample, as non-voters, rather than excluded 
completely. For VV2, the sample is more like VEP, because the sample is limited only to 
matched registrants, meaning that no voting-non-eligible people can be in the sample. For VV3, 
neither VAP nor VEP is a great match, because VV3 uses includes some non-matched 
respondents in the sample, but not all.  
Ultimately, precision about each VV measure’s comparability to VEP versus VAP did 
not bear great significance, because as Table 4 shows, VV1 is the closest estimate for both types 
of actual turnout, VAP and VEP. Among the 51 state-level turnout estimates (50 + DC), VV1 is 
off from VAP turnout by an average of less than one percentage point, far less than any other 
measure.  
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Table 4: Selecting a Validated Voter-Turnout Measure 
Turnout Measure: VV1 VV2 VV3 VV1 VV2 VV3 
 Compared to  
Turnout Among: Voting Age Population Voting Eligible Population 
Average Percent Error (%) 8.38 42.15 28.41 9.31 32.07 19.36 
Average Bias (%-Pt. Diff) 0.91 22.98 15.41 -3.25 18.83 11.26 
Average |Bias| 6.65 31.05 21.49 0.56 24.96 15.40 
SOURCE: Actual Turnout Data from McDonald (n.d.): www.electproject.org/2016g  
 
Agadjanian’s (2018b) findings also appear to support the selection of VV1 as the voter-
turnout measure of choice. Agadjanian’s figures report that 2016 CCES state-level turnout 
estimates are off from VEP turnout by an average of -4 percentage points. This is quite close to 
the -3.25 average bias figure that was calculated for VV1 as compared to the same actual turnout 
measure (VEP). The two average bias estimates are not exactly equal, which is of some concern, 
but it may be due to a difference between the 2016-only CCES data set (used in this thesis’ 
analysis) and the 2006-2016 CCES Cumulative File (used in Agadjanian’s analysis).  
As such, VV1 is the best measure of voter turnout to use in this analysis, because it 
minimizes state-level bias in turnout. It also is the best estimate of national voter turnout, 
calculated as a simple weighted mean of individuals in the data set. Nationwide turnout was 
59.2%/54.7%  (VEP/VAP) in 2016; VV1, VV2, and VV3 produce weighted means of 55.8%, 
79.0%, and 71.0%, respectively. It should be noted that the analysis in this thesis is primarily at 
the individual level and not the state level, so the problem of state-level bias was, even at the 
start, not as pressing. Indeed, the CCES is currently one of the premier national data sets for 
studying individual-level political behavior (Grimmer, et al. 2017, 2). Nonetheless, it is best to 
seek the best measure possible, and state-level turnout will be included as a potential confound in 
analysis through the inclusion of state fixed-effects.  
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3. Modeling Social Media Behavior  
The next step to prepare the CCES data for analysis was to devise measures for the two 
types of news-related social media behavior described in RQ1 and RQ2: consumption and active 
engagement. To create those measures, explanatory factor analysis (EFA) is performed on five 
variables from the CCES.  
As introduced above, the CCES is unique in that it asks respondents above their active 
social media posting, not just their social media use. Also distinctive about these questions is that 
they ask the Yes/No question of whether respondents engaged in a given activity in the last 
twenty-four hours, rather than how frequently they may have done so over a given period of 
time, such as the last week. Framing questions this way should increase the accuracy of the 
measure. People are notoriously poor estimators, including when it comes to their own behavior 
(Brennan 2016). Asking respondents to remember only whether they did something at all over 
the last twenty-four hours of their lives, rather than summarize the frequency of doing so over 
the last week, or month, theoretically increases the odds that they provide an accurate answer. 
All five questions used to create social media scores were asked in the pre-election wave. 
Respondents were first asked whether they had used social media in the past twenty-four hours. 
19,286 respondents had not. The 45,314 respondents that answered in the affirmative were asked 
a follow-up question which asked whether they did each of the following on social media in the 
last twenty-four hours: 
1.  “Posted a story, photo, video or link about politics” 
2. “Posted a comment about politics” 
3. “Read a story or watched a video about politics” 
4. “Followed a political event” 
5. “Forwarded a story, photo, video or link about politics to friends” 
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 Given the five variables, the total number of possible response patterns is 32. The 
relatively small size of this set of possible response patterns (Bartholomew, Knott, & Moustaki 
2011, 84) allows it to be displayed as a frequency distribution (included in the Appendix as 
Table 10). Brief examination of this distribution allows some insights. The most frequent 
response pattern, at 22.69% of social media users, is a respondent having read or watched a story 
about politics in the past twenty-four hours but not having engaged in any of the remaining four 
activities. The next two most frequent patterns are markedly less than the most frequent 
response. These second and third-most frequent response patterns are also the two extremes: 
having engaged in none of the activities in the past twenty-four hours and having engaged in all 
of them. Having engaged in none of the activities is roughly 5 percentage points less frequent 
than the most frequent pattern, coming in at 17.45% of social media users, and the jump from 
none to all is even more drastic, with only 10% of social media users engaging in all six 
activities (a difference of roughly 7.5 percentage points). 
With an understanding of the pattern of people’s responses, the next step was to attempt 
to analytically differentiate between the two types of social media news use, consumption and 
active engagement. Factor analysis allows that difference to be teased out specifically within the 
analytical sample of this thesis.  
Factor analysis attempts to uncover and interpret patterns and relationships within data by 
identifying a number of “factors,” unobserved traits, that predict “measures,” observed behavior. 
Factors are also referred to as “latent” and “unobserved” traits. Factor analysis can be performed 
on a variety of combinations of variable types of factors and measures; social scientific scholars 
increasingly using factor analysis to isolate continuous factors from dichotomous measures, a 
fundamental form of latent variable analysis.  
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EFA works by testing a range of hypotheses regarding the relationships between the 
observed variables, narrowing the set of hypothetical relationships to find which variables tend to 
“go together” (Yong & Pearce 2013, 80). The final output of EFA is the smallest set of factors 
that accounts for the highest amount of correlation amongst the observed variables (80). Ideally, 
each variable will be highly correlated with one factor and not strongly correlated with any other. 
The correlation of each variable with each factor is called a “loading,” and the table of each 
variable’s loading onto each factor is called a “pattern matrix.” Hair et al. (1998) provide 
thresholds for practical significance of factor loadings: ≥ 0.3 = “minimal,”  ≥  0.4 = “more 
important”, and ≥ 0.5 = “practically significant” (111). The “communality” of a variable in a 
factor analysis is the sum of its squared loadings, and can be interpreted as the proportion of total 
variation in that variable that is explained by the factors.  
The factor analysis below was performed in Stata/IC 15.1, as was all other analysis. 
Stata’s factor command was used to perform EFA, using the iterated principal-factor option 
(IPF) based on the recommendation of Habing (2003). Whereas other methods for fitting factor 
analysis models use the same initial estimate of each variable’s communality throughout each 
successive attempted model fit, the iterated principal factor method recalculates the 
communalities with each new fitted model (Habing 2003, 5). Habing (2003) recommends IPF so 
long as the final model has neither impossible communalities (greater than one) nor negative 
error variances (5). As is seen below, neither is the case in this model. 
An initial EFA of the five social media behavior variables yields a four-factor model 
(pattern matrix included in the Appendix as Table 11). This is not much of a reduction in 
variables. Importantly, the third and fourth factors are very lightly loaded; most loadings onto 
them are less than 0.1, and the greatest in terms of absolute value is 0.14.  According to Hair et 
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al.’s (1998) thresholds, these loadings are of less than even “minimal” practical significance. On 
those grounds, further analysis is limited to only the first two factors.  
After limiting the EFA to only two factors, Stata returns an improved pattern matrix with 
more-significant loadings (included in the Appendix as Table 12). Posting, commenting, 
forwarding, and following all have practically significant loadings onto at least one factor, and 
reading/watching is slightly more than minimally significant. However, another potential 
problem remains: multiple variables load relatively-significantly onto more than one factor. This 
will make interpretation of the factors more difficult, and according to Habing (2003), should be 
avoided if possible.  
To correct this, the factors can be rotated. Dr. Maike Rahn of TheAnalysisFactor.com 
provides a very intuitive explanation of factor rotation. As Dr. Rahn describes it, the two factors 
are axes along which each variable is positioned. When Stata conducts the initial EFA, it isolates 
the first factor (axis), holds that constant, then finds the second. Once these two factors (axes) 
have been found, however, they do not always result in the best possible fit of the data. Rotating 
the axes can make them fit the variables better. A side-effect of rotation is that it ideally aligns 
each variable primarily with only one factor, thereby making the factors more easily 
interpretable.  
There are two main families of rotation techniques: orthogonal and oblique. Orthogonal 
rotations preserve the original EFA’s assumption that the factors are not correlated. Continuing 
to use the analogy of axes, an orthogonal rotation preserves the ninety-degree angle between the 
axes. An oblique rotation relaxes that assumption and allows the factors to be correlated. In the 
axis analogy, the angle between newly-rotated axes is allowed to no longer be exactly ninety 
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degrees. As seen in Figure 2 below, rotating the factors does improve the overall fit to the data, 
making the relationship between variables, plotted on the two factors, more linear.  
 
 
In this case, an oblique rotation was used for the social media behavior factor analysis. 
Theorizing that the two factors are baseline social media news consumption and active social 
media posting (akin to Scott et al.’s (2017) “frequency” and “engagement”), it should be 
expected that the factors are somewhat correlated. The results of this final factor analysis are 
presented in Table 5 below. After rotating the factors and allowing them to be correlated, most 
variables settle nicely onto one of the two factors. As a result, the interpretation of the factors as 
propensity for active social media posting and propensity for baseline social media use, 
respectively, becomes clear. Posting and commenting both load highly and primarily onto the 
first factor, seemingly because each involves the active moving-around and/or creation of 
political content. Reading/watching content and following an event load heavily and primarily 
onto the second factor, likely because they are more passive activities. Interestingly, forwarding 
content loads more heavily onto the first factor, but also loads onto the second factor (with a 
loading four times greater than any other variable’s non-dominant loading). This is makes sense; 
forwarding content would require first consuming it.  
Figure 2: Social Media EFA Loadings, Before and After Rotation 
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Table 5: Social Media Behavior EFA Results 
Variable Active Engagement Consumption Communality 
Post Content 0.8236 - 0.6303 
Post Comment 0.6138 - 0.5324 
Forward Content 0.4351 0.2691 0.4269 
Read/Watch Content - 0.5640 0.3796 
Follow Event - 0.6614 0.4349 
*Factor loadings ≤ 0.1 omitted for clarity. Version including omitted loadings available in the 
Appendix as Table 13. 
**Iterated Principal Factors Method, Oblique Promax Rotation, 2 Factor Limit 
 With the two factors now identified, a score could be created for each. Two main 
approaches were considered: (weighted) sum scores and regression scores. The benefit of sum 
scores is interpretation; in regression analysis, an increase of one unit for a sum score simply 
means engaging in one more activity, while an increase of one unit for a regression score is much 
less clear to interpret. Sum scores, however, give each variable equal weight, when in reality, 
such may not be the case (DiStefano, Zhu, & Mîndrilă 2009, 8). 
In the case of the Consumption factor, giving equal weight to the two variables which 
load most heavily would not make an irreconcilable assumption. Although following an event 
does load more strongly onto the factor than does reading/watching content, the difference is not 
so large as to suggest a very large difference in importance. In contrast, it is reasonable to 
suspect that the variables going into the active engagement score should not be weighted equally; 
as seen in Table 5, the variables load significantly differently onto that factor, suggesting that 
certain variables (e.g. posting content) are significantly more related to the underlying factor than 
others (e.g. forwarding content).  
One method to account for this unequal importance of variables is to create weighted sum 
scores, by using variables’ loadings as weights. This gives the most important variables the most 
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weight on the resulting score, though the benefit of doing so is premised on the loadings 
representing true differences in the importance of the variables. When doing so, the fact should 
be considered that it is always possible that the differences implied by the loadings are not 
factual, but rather are simply the effects of choices made during the EFA process, such as 
rotation (DiStefano, Zhu, & Mîndrilă 2009, 8).  
A second method to account for the unequal importance of variables is to use OLS 
regression to predict each respondent’s location on each factor. This is the default prediction 
method in many statistical packages, including Stata. It differs from a weighted sum in that it 
takes into account not only the relationship between the variables and the factors (through the 
loadings), but also among the variables themselves, and between the factors, if they have been 
allowed to be correlated (which, in this case, they have) (DiStefano, Zhu, & Mîndrilă 2009, 4). 
Scores computed using the regression method are standardized, with a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation equal to the squared multiple correlation between the factor and its constituent 
variables (4). 
 Regression was 
ultimately the method used to 
create scores for Consumption 
and Active Engagement. The 
justification for this choice is 
twofold: first, regression best 
accommodates for the split loading of forwarding content, seen in Table 5 above. Secondly, the 
correlation between the two factors is most easily accounted for through the regression method. 
The distributions of the two scores created through that method are plotted in Figure 3 above; as 
Figure 3: Kernel 
Densities of SM 
Factor Scores 
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that figure shows, both scores are heavily skewed to the right, with many respondents falling at 
the scores’ minimum values. The scores generally appear to follow a power law distribution, 
matching previous findings regarding the distribution of social media use in Java, Song, Finin & 
Tseng (2007) and Leskovec et al. (2007).  
4. Modeling Political Knowledge 
In addition to a model of respondents’ social media news use, subsequent analysis 
requires a model of respondents’ political knowledge. Again, EFA was used to separate 
questions into two groupings, using many of the same assumptions and techniques as the social 
media behavior EFA above. However, final scores were manually created, rather than through 
the regression method as above, because doing so both improves interpretation and allows two 
sets of scores to be created, differing in their treatment of “Not Sure” responses.   
The political knowledge EFA is performed on six measures: respondents’ ability to 
correctly identify the parties of the current Congressional majority, the current Senate majority, 
their U.S. Representative, their two U.S. Senators, and their Governor. A “correct response” was 
coded by comparing the respondent’s guess to contextual variables containing the actual party of 
the chamber/officeholder in question. That process was repeated for each of the six variables, to 
create six binary variables, indicating accuracy of response to each question. Given these six 
items, the total number of possible response patterns is 64. This again relatively small set of 
possible response patterns is displayed as a frequency distribution in the Appendix, Table 14.  
Again, brief examination of the frequency distribution provides some insights. 35% of the 
sample answered all six questions correctly. Another 12% failed to answer a single correctly. Of 
the remaining 53%, a number of combinations were relatively more common, each appearing 
between four and five percent of the time in the total sample: correctly identifying individuals 
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but not chambers, correctly identifying all but the respondent’s Representative, and correctly 
identifying all but the party in control of the Senate. In the next tier, occurring roughly 2.5% of 
the time in the total sample, respondents correctly identified only their governor or correctly 
identified all but the party in control of the House. 
It is worthwhile to compare the performance of CCES respondents on political 
identification measures to those cited in Chapter Two above. As a reminder, a 2014 APPC 
survey found that 38% of Americans could correctly identify the party in control of the U.S. 
House, and the same percent could do so for the Senate. In the CCES data set, the success rate is 
considerably higher: 62% of respondents correctly identified the Republican majority in the 
House and 57% did so for the Senate.  
This difference may be due to two factors, both related to timing. The APPC survey was 
conduct July 8-14, 2014. In contrast, the CCES political knowledge questions were asked in the 
pre-election wave of the survey that was in the field from September 28 to November 7, 2016. 
As such, the CCES questions were asked anywhere from two to four months closer to the 
Election Day of the given year than were the APPC questions. Secondly, the 2016 election 
included the presidential race, while the 2014 election did not, and presidential elections are 
widely known to garner higher visibility and generate increased interest in politics at all levels. 
Because of these effects, politics were likely relatively-higher salience around the time of the 
CCES, as compared to the time of the APPC survey, explaining some of the difference. 
 The second political knowledge statistic cited in Chapter Two that can be compared to 
CCES estimates is Americans’ knowledge of the party of their Representative in Congress. A 
2017 survey found that 56% of Americans claimed to know their personal Representative’s party 
(Freiling 2017). CCES respondents accurately identified the party of their Congressperson 60.1% 
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of the time – fairly close to the statistic from Freiling (2017). Still, there are immediate 
differences between the two calculations; the Freiling figure represents respondents’ claim of 
knowledge, whereas the CCES figure represents respondents’ actual knowledge. Delving deeply 
into the differences between the two is not the purpose of this thesis. It is simply interesting and, 
to some extent, affirming that the figures are relatively similar. 
 Returning to the full set of six CCES questions, as with social media behavior, a way to 
accurately reduce the six items into a more workable set of measures is needed. Factor analysis 
allows the various types of party identification to distinguished from one another. As for social 
media use, the iterated principal factors method is used. IPF is in this case again acceptable 
because neither impossible communalities nor negative error variances are present. Running an 
initial EFA with no limit on the number of factors returns a set of five factors (see Appendix, 
Table 15). Again, as was the case in the social media use EFA, only two of the factors had 
variables load onto them by more than 0.15. Therefore, the EFA was limited to only two factors. 
The two-factor limited EFA-IPF returned a much-improved pattern matrix in which most 
loadings are roughly 0.4 or greater (see Appendix, Table 16). However, two variables again 
loaded onto more than one of the factors, with non-dominant loadings just shy of 0.4. Therefore, 
the factors were again rotated, using an oblique rotation, because types of knowledge may be 
correlated. Based on the rotated loadings, included in Table 6 below, two clusters appear: one 
which represents knowledge of one’s own personal representation in government and one 
representing knowledge of broader balances of political power. Conceptually, it makes sense for 
those two factors to be distinct; someone can know the general state of things in Congress, but 
not pay much attention to their exact own representatives, and vice-versa.  
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Table 6: Political Knowledge EFA Results 
Variable PersonalKnowledge GeneralKnowledge Communality 
House Majority - 0.7650 0.6498 
Senate Majority - 0.7695 0.6280 
Governor 0.6753 - 0.5178 
Representative 0.6642 - 0.4866 
Senator 1 0.7394 - 0.5823 
Senator 2 0.6789 - 0.5260 
*Factor loadings ≤ 0.1 omitted for clarity. Version including omitted loadings available in the 
  Appendix as Table 17.  
**Iterated Principal Factors Method, Oblique Promax Rotation, 2 Factor Limit 
 
 With variables now separated by factor, scores could be created. In contrast to the social 
media scores above, a simple sum method was used to created scores for political knowledge. 
This is similar to the way index scores were created in Jung, Kim, and Gil de Zúñiga (2011). In 
contrast to the social media EFA above, variables per knowledge factor here load roughly 
equally; Senator 1 loads slightly more than the other three variables that load onto personal 
knowledge, but not to an extent that causes concern.  
 Two sets of scores were created for the knowledge factors, to examine the effects of 
taking into account Fortin-Rittberger’s (2016) findings regarding the exclusion of “Not Sure” 
responses. Quick analysis of the six questions used provides strong evidence for the gender 
guessing gap; after applying survey weights, the group of respondents who responded “Not 
Sure” on at least one political knowledge question was 40% male versus 60% female. 
 The first set of scores created were the “standard” scores, which simply calculate the 
proportion of questions per factor that the respondent correctly answered. For these scores, when 
a respondent answered “Not Sure,” it was coded as an incorrect answer. The second set of scores 
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codes such “Not Sure” responses as missing values, rather than incorrect. These are the scores 
that attempt to incorporate Fortin-Rittberger’s (2016) findings, and they represent the number of 
questions a respondent answered correctly when they actually attempted to answer the question.  
All four scores have ranges [0,1]. Their distributions are discussed in more detail in the 
descriptive analytics section of Chapter Four. Hereafter, when the two sets of scores are 
referenced, the standard scores may also be referred to as the “Incorrect” scores, and the Fortin-
Rittberger-esque scores may be referred to as the “Missing” scores – referencing their respective 
treatments of “Not Sure” responses.  
 Although calculating these scores as proportions means that interpretation is not as neat 
as a simple sum, the added benefit of accounting for some of the gender bias in political 
knowledge questions makes the trade-off by far worth it. Additionally, interpretation of these 
proportional scores is still easier than regression score output, which would have been the default 
choice. 
5.  Other Selected Variables for Analysis 
The final step in data preparation was to recode the available variables for the 
confounding factors identified in Chapter Two. Age was created by subtracting the respondent’s 
reported birth year from 2016. Female (0 male, 1 female) was created from the native CCES 
variable for gender. Income was created from the native variable faminc, preserving faminc’s 
categories up to $149,999, but collapsing higher-income categories into a single “$150,000 or 
more” category in order to increase bin sample size. Similarly, the educ variable was bottom-
coded, combining “No HS” and “HS Grad” into a single “HS or Less” category, to increase bin 
sample size – the “No HS” category contained less than 500 respondents in the original data. 
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Race was left mostly untouched, besides changing the order of values so that “Middle Eastern” 
came before “Mixed” and “Other,” rather than after – purely for display purposes.  The 
respondent’s state of residence was accounted for with the native CCES variable inputstate. 
For ideology and party ID, the simplest-possible variables were used. In other words, no 
degrees of strength were included, such as “Strong Democrat” vs. “Lean Democrat” – 
respondents were simply Democrats. For party ID, the possible values were Democrat, 
Republican, Independent, Other, and Not Sure. For ideology, the possible values were Liberal, 
Moderate, Conservative, and Not Sure. 
The reason for using these simpler measures that do not account for strength of 
attachment is two-fold: first, after looking into the CCES’ party ID variables a good deal, it 
seems as though there is some erroneous self-sorting by respondents that was not intended by the 
survey designers. The potential responses for the most-specific party ID variable were: Strong 
Democrat, Not Very Strong Democrat, Lean Democrat, Independent, Lean Republican, Not Very 
Strong Republican, Strong Republican, and Not Sure. When that variable was used to predict 
voting, an unexpected pattern emerged. Rather than voting increasing in likelihood as party ID 
increased in strength (from Independent to Lean to Not Very Strong to Strong), it instead 
increased from Independent to Lean, but dipped at Not Very Strong, then increased again at 
Strong. Based on that pattern, it is suspected that respondents interpreted the “Lean” and “Not 
Very Strong” labels in an unusual way, perhaps reversing the order of magnitude in their heads, 
despite the order of listing.  
For that reason, simple identifications, without strengths, were used. The “center” 
category was used as the reference category for both variables in regression – for ideology, 
Moderates, and for party ID, Independents. Additionally, the interaction between these two 
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variables was also included in all regressions, since it is reasonable to expect that people among 
the same party ID group might behave differently based on their ideology. This is supported by 
several commonly-identified trends, in which people have complicated relationships with party 
labels. It has been frequently reported that partisan independents who do not claim a partisan ID 
often still essentially act like partisans (Hawkins & Nosek 2012, Smith 2016). Additionally, as of 
2008, the American public was trending towards conservative ideologies, but party IDs were not 
shifting as rapidly (Norrander & Wilcox 2008). The interaction between these two variables in 
the 2016 election is explored in the Descriptive Analysis section of Chapter Four below, which 
shows that there are some party IDs within which there is distinct variation in ideology. 
Lastly, the control variable for having gotten news from other (non-social media sources) 
was constructed from three CCES variables: CC16_300_2, CC16_300_3, and CC16_300_4. 
These variables record whether respondents “watched TV news,” “read a newspaper in print or 
online,” and “listened to a radio news program or talk radio” in the past 24 hours, respectively. 
OtherNewsUse was set to 1 if the respondent had done any one or more of these three items; it 
was set to 0 if they had done none. 
6. Regression Models 
With the causal diagram, social media and knowledge scores, and other recoded variables 
in hand, regression models could now be constructed. The first set of regressions build on the 
causal diagram created in Figure 1, and seek support for H1: consuming political news through 
social media will be positively related to voting, and H2: the effect of social media news use on 
voting will be partially mediated by an increase in political knowledge. In that set, I include six 
separate models, distinguished by their inclusion/exclusion of state fixed effects, the presence of 
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mediating variables, and the type (coding) of those mediating variables. Those models are 
summarized in Table 7 below. As that table shows, there is one model for each possible 
combination of the three defining characteristics; this will allow comparison of models where 
only one key aspect has been changed. 
Table 7: Descriptions of Voting Regression Models 
Model Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 
State Fixed Effects       
Mediation Variables       
Coding of Mediation 
Variables (Treatment of 
“Not Sure” Responses) 
N/A N/A Missing Incorrect Missing Incorrect 
 
The first regression in the set is a multivariate regression of the outcome (voted) on the 
treatment (social media use), with controls, but without the knowledge variables. Logit 
regression is used due to the binary nature of the outcome variable. Both Consumption and 
ActiveEngagement, as well as an interaction term between the two, are included, because the two 
scores were allowed to be correlated when created using the regression method, meaning we 
therefore might expect that their effects are commingled. The variables for party ID and ideology 
are also interacted with each other. Model (2) is the same as model (1) with the simple addition 
of state fixed effects (+ β13*Statei ). 
logit(votedi) = β0 + β1*Consumptioni + β2*ActiveEngagementi  
                       + β3*Consumptioni*ActiveEngagementi + β4*Agei  + β5*Femalei + β6*Racei   
                                  + β7*Educi  + β8*Incomei + β9*PIDi + β10*Ideologyi + β11*PIDi*Ideologyi  
                      + β12*OtherNewsUsei + εi                                                                                        (1) 
Next, I add in the score variables for general and personal political knowledge to act 
(theoretically) as mediators. There are four such regressions – models (3) through (6). The first 
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two include the mediating variables but do not include state fixed effects. Such an equation is 
included below.   
logit(votedi) = β0 + β1*Consumptioni + β2*ActiveEngagementi  
                       + β3*Consumptioni*ActiveEngagementi + β4*GeneralKnowledgei  
                       + β5*PersonalKnowledgei + β6*Agei  + β7*Femalei  + β8*Racei  + β9*Educi   
                       + β10*Incomei + β11*PIDi + β12*Ideologyi + β13*PIDi*Ideologyi  
                       + β14*OtherNewsUsei + εi                                                                                    (3/4) 
 However, that equation represents two separate regressions, models (3) and (4). Those 
models are distinguished from each other by the coding of GeneralKnowledge and 
PersonalKnowledge; model (3) uses versions of those variables in which “Not Sure” responses 
were coded missing, thereby dropping from analysis people who responded “Not Sure” on both 
General or all four Personal knowledge questions. This type of model has been referred to 
throughout this thesis has a “Missing” model. Model (4), then, uses knowledge measures in 
which “Not Sure” reponses were coded as incorrect guesses, thereby keeping more respondents 
in the analytical sample. The expoentiated coefficients on Consumption in (1) and (2) will be 
used in identifying any mediation resulting from the addition of the knowledge variables Models 
(5) and (6), then, are the same as models (3) and (4), respectively, with the exception of the 
addition of state fixed effects (+ β15*Statei ). 
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Results 
In this chapter, I present the results of the models developed in Chapters Two to Three. 
Before presenting the results of the regression analyses, I first review the operationalized 
variables from Sections 3.2 through 3.5, to provide an understanding of the data.  
1. Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive statistics for all variables used in analysis are included in Table 8 below. 
That table is split, to provide summary information for the variables in the differing contexts of 
the various models outlined in Section 3.6 above.  
Table 8: Weighted Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
Knowledge Score Type 
(Treatment of “Not 
Sure” Responses”) 
Missing Incorrect Common to Both 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Min Max 
Consumption .0770 .8608 .0034 .8222 -.7226 1.8994 
ActiveEngagement .0663 .9151 -.0021 .8757 -.6320 2.0459 
GeneralKnowledge .8037 .3355 .5950 .4426 0 1 
PersonalKnowledge .9015 .2144 .6769 .3679 0 1 
Age 48.7264 17.1670 46.7614 17.1736 18 95 
Female .4613 .4985 .5138 .4998 0 1 
Educ 3.4604 1.4222 3.3029 1.3857 2 6 
Race 1.5810 1.3271 1.6070 1.3348 1 8 
Income 6.4262 3.1503 6.0341 3.1564 1 12 
PID 1.9858 .9360 2.0924 1.0704 1 5 
Ideology 2.1768 .8318 2.2604 .8221 1 4 
OtherNewsUse .9118 .2836 .8638 .3430 0 1 
Voted .6115 .4874 .5590 .4965 0 1 
InputState 28.2899 15.8287 28.3440 15.7600 1 56 
Observations 35,120 46,359 N/A 
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As that table shows, the distributions of certain variables are similar across model types, 
while others differ. Descriptive statistics are not split out by presence of inputstate in the model, 
as all observations have a value for that variable, meaning that samples with and without that 
variable in the model have identical samples. Additionally, the minimum and maximum values 
of all variables are the same across model types; therefore, only the variable means and standard 
deviations are broken out by model. 
Based on Table 8, it is clear that the coding of “Not Sure” responses to knowledge 
questions impacts the sample in meaningful ways. First, the sample is over five percentage points 
less female when “Not Sure” responses are coded as Missing. The 22% of respondents who 
responded “Not Sure” to both GeneralKnowledge questions were two times as likely to be 
women than men. The 11.4% of respondents who responded “Not Sure” or “Never Heard of the 
Person” to all four PersonalKnowledge questions were 75% more likely to be men than women. 
Therefore, it follows that dropping those people would make the sample relatively more male. 
Out of the remaining people – respondents who attempted to answer at least one question 
on each knowledge score – men were still more likely to have higher accuracy on the questions 
they attempted. However, the gap was smaller for the PersonalKnowledge score than for the 
GeneralKnowledge score. Men were 30% more likely to have 100% accuracy on the 
GeneralKnowledge questions (40.4% of men scored 1.0 on GeneralKnowledge vs. 31.0% of 
women). However, men were only 25% more likely to have 100% accuracy on the 
PersonalKnowledge questions (43.4% M vs. 34.6% F). The reduced gender disparity on 
PersonalKnowledge as compared to GeneralKnowledge may be evidence to support the claim 
made in Chapter Two that localizing/personalizing political knowledge questions is one way to 
reduce gender bias, as found in Miller (2018). 
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Additionally, voter turnout is roughly five percentage points higher in the “Missing” 
sample, suggesting that the people who are dropped as a result of coding “Not Sure’s” as missing 
were majority non-voters. There is also a roughly two-year difference in mean age between the 
samples as well, indicating that the people dropped from the “Missing” sample are generally 
young. Still, the distribution of age in both samples is similar to the “true” distribution as 
reported by the Census Bureau. The two modes, around 30 and 
60 years old, match the documented pattern in the United States 
(Rogers 2016); the Baby Boomer generation is in their late 
fifties to mid-sixties, and their children’s generation is in their 
late twenties to mid-thirties. Both of these groups were larger 
than the generations before and after them (the Baby Boomer’s 
children’s generation because there were so many Baby 
Boomers giving birth), which led to the “lumpy” appearance of 
the age distribution in the US today.  
The treatment and mediating variables’ characteristics also differ across the two samples. 
Those scores’ distributions are plotted in Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8. Both 
social media scores’ means are actually closer to zero in the “Incorrect” (larger) sample – given 
that their means were set to zero in the process of creation and the Incorrect sample has over 
10,000 more observations than the Missing sample, this is relatively unsurprising. However, the 
scores’ distributions are otherwise very similar, as seen in the two figures below. The 
distributions are highly right-skewed, with most people occupying low score regions. 
 
 
Figure 4: Age Distributions 
by Model Sample 
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In the knowledge scores, there are over 20 percentage point differences in means across 
model samples (20 and 23, specifically). These are significant, but again unsurprising – these are 
the variables distinguishing the two samples, and coding over 10,000 “Not Sure” responses as 
incorrect answers is undoubtedly going to shift the distribution of the knowledge variables, as 
seen in Figure 7 and Figure 8. Still, even with those responses coded as zero’s, people answered 
knowledge questions correctly more often than not.  
 
Figure 5: Distribution of 
Social Media Consumption 
by Model Sample 
Figure 6: Distribution of 
Social Media Engagement 
by Model Sample 
Figure 8: Distribution of General 
Knowledge Scores by Model Sample 
Figure 7: Distribution of Personal 
Knowledge Scores by Model Sample 
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OtherNewsUse’s weighted means of .91 and .86 indicates that most people in the survey 
sample got news in the 24 hours preceding their interview from at least one source that was not 
social media, whether it was TV news, the newspaper, or talk radio. This is relatively 
unsurprising.  
Among the remaining variables, there is 
little difference between the two samples. Race is 
generally appropriately distributed in the samples, 
with roughly 75% of respondents self-identifying 
as whole and roughly 12% as black, compared to 
76.6% and 13.4% in Census estimates (Census 
QuickFacts). The survey data also approximate the 
reality of educational attainment in the US, with 
roughly three in ten Americans having a Bachelor’s 
degree or above. The distribution of income also 
generally matches reality. The median family income 
level in both samples is the $50,000 - $59,999 bracket; 
the median household income as reported by the 
Census Bureau for the time period that includes 2016 
was $57,652 (in 2017 dollars). More detailed 
distributions of income in the samples are plotted in 
Figure 10. 
Next, I explore the analytical sample by political beliefs. The distributions of ideologies 
and party identifications within the analytical sample are plotted in Figure 11 and Figure 12, 
Figure 9: Distribution of Educational 
Attainment by Model Sample 
Figure 10: Income Distribution in 
Analytical Sample 
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respectively. Those figures show that the distributions of their respective characteristics do not 
differ greatly across the two model samples. The primary exception to that rule is the category of 
people which are “Not Sure” about the identification at hand, ideological or partisan. Those 
people are largely dropped from the sample through the process of dropping people who were 
“Not Sure” on the political knowledge questions; this is logical. Moving past people “Not Sure” 
about their identifications, Figure 11 shows that the most common ideological identification in 
the analytical sample is identifying as a moderate; a close second is identifying as conservative. 
Just over half as many people identify as liberal, followed by roughly 7.5% of the analytical 
sample identifying “strongly” as conservative and 6.8% as strongly liberal. 2.4% of people 
included in the analytical sample were not sure about their ideologies. Based on those 
percentages, it is clear that many more people in the analytical sample identify as conservative 
than as liberal. However, Figure 12 shows that, contrary to what a conservative ideological 
balance might suggest, there are actually more Democrats in the analytical sample than 
Republicans.  
 
 
Figure 11: Ideological Distribution 
by Model Sample 
Figure 12: Distribution of Party 
Identifications by Model Sample 
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The explanation for these two seemingly contradictory trends becomes clear upon 
inspection of Figure 13, which presents the breakdown of party identification among people who 
described themselves as ideological 
moderates. As that figure shows, ideological 
moderates in the sample were over two and 
a half times as likely to identify as an 
Independent or a Democrat than to identify 
as a Republican. This pattern serves as 
evidence of people’s complicated 
relationships with party ID and ideology, as 
mentioned in Chapter Three above. 
2. Regression of Voting on Social Media News Use 
Table 9 contains partial output from regressions (1) through (6) from Section 3.6 above, 
with results given as odds ratios (exponentiated coefficients). (Full regression results are 
included in Appendix B, Table 18). From Table 9, two primary conclusions can be drawn: 
models with state fixed effects strictly dominate those without, and mediated models using the 
“Incorrect” scores perform better than those using the “Missing” scores. Support for these two 
conclusions is drawn from p-values that result from applying Hosmer-Lemeshow tests to each 
model. In that test, one of many that can be used to evaluate model goodness of fit, a small p-
value suggests poor fit; a large value does not necessarily indicate good fit, rather a lack of 
evidence to prove a bad fit – perhaps due to a lack of power/small sample size (Hosmer, 
Lemeshow, & Sturdivant 2013, 157-169; Archer & Lemeshow 2006).  
Figure 13: Party IDs of Self-Reported 
Ideological Moderates 
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Table 9: Exponentiated Coefficients on Treatment and Mediating Variables, Logit Regressions 
of Voting on Social Media Use 
Model Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 
State Fixed Effects       
Mediation Variables       
Treatment of “Not 
Sure” Responses N/A N/A Missing Incorrect Missing Incorrect 
Observations 47,400 47,400 35,120 46,359 35,120 46,359 
Hosmer-Lemeshow 
Test p-Value 0.0363 0.2776 0.0021 0.1446 0.0048 0.2276 
Consumption 1.135*** 1.140*** 1.118** 1.086* 1.119** 1.089* 
Active Engagement 0.964 0.965 0.936 0.975 0.941 0.976 
Consumption *  
Active Engagement 1.027 1.024 1.034 1.017 1.03 1.014 
General Knowledge   1.683*** 1.356*** 1.660*** 1.348*** 
Personal Knowledge   3.160*** 2.684*** 3.217*** 2.740*** 
…More Variables… … … … … … … 
Exponentiated coefficients, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
From the Hosmer-Lemeshow test p-values in Table 9, we can see that models 1, 3, and 5 
are poor fits for the data, while we have no evidence to support a similar conclusion for models 
2, 4, and 6. These are: the unmediated model with state fixed effects, the “Incorrect” mediated 
model without stated fixed effects, and the “Incorrect” mediated model with state fixed effects. 
Therefore, we can safely conclude that the “Incorrect” mediating variables provide the better 
model. We can also generally assume that including state fixed effects improves the model; for 
example, within the models which do not include the mediating variables (1 and 2), the model 
without state fixed effects is shown to be a very poor fit, while the model with state fixed effects 
is not eliminated. Therefore, models (2) and (6) appear to be the best models for further analysis.  
While their large p-values do not automatically mean that the models are good fits, the very large 
sample sizes reduce the likelihood that the large p-values are simply the result of a lack of 
statistical power to prove model misspecification.  
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 Figure 14 provides another way to compare two of the models from Table 9: models 5 
and 6. In that figure, we can see that the method for calculating political knowledge affects few 
variables in the analysis. The variable most significantly affected is female – this is unsurprising, 
as the main distinction between the two models is whether they drop people who responded “Not 
Sure” to a significant number of knowledge questions, and those people were two times more 
likely to be female than male.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moving forward with models (2) and (6), the specific effects of variables can be 
examined. The statistically-significant exponentiated coefficient on Consumption in Model (2) 
provides evidence that there is in fact a significant, positive effect of consuming news over social 
media on likelihood of voting, as posited in H1. People who consumed news through social 
media were more likely to vote. Interestingly, however, the statistically-insignificant 
exponentiated coefficients on ActiveEngagement and on the interaction between Consumption 
and ActiveEngagement suggest that actively engaging with content has no statistically 
meaningful impact on likelihood of voting. Nonetheless, there is a pattern, as seen in Figure 15: 
Figure 14: Odds Ratios Across Mediated Models of Voting (Comparing 
Methods for Calculating Political Knowledge) 
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more ActiveEngagement seems to 
reduce likelihood of voting (seen in 
the 0.964 odds ratio on 
ActiveEngagement), though this 
effect varies by level of 
Consumption. As Consumption level 
increases, ActiveEngagement’s 
effect decreases in size. People who 
scored less than the maximum value on Consumption are generally less likely to vote; they are 
even less likely to vote if they are low consumers but highly-active sharers. These differences 
cannot be stated with absolute certainty, due to the statistical insignificance of the interaction 
term; technically, the trends are statistically indistinguishable from one another. However, 
graphic representation of the trends suggests a general pattern. 
Most other variables in model (2) are also statistically significant, as seen in Appendix B, 
Table 18: age, income, educational attainment, race, party ID, ideology, interactions between 
part ID and ideology, and state. The only confounds not statistically significant in model (2) are 
OtherNewsUse and sex. The exponentiated coefficients on the statistically-significant confounds 
in the model suggest that (separately from each other) being older, having more income, having 
more than a high-school education, being white, identifying with a party, and identifying with a 
specific ideology each predicts increased likelihood of voting. Additionally, living in Colorado, 
Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, or Washington is predicted to make one more likely to vote in 2016 than someone 
living in California. Finally, having a party ID and ideology that do not traditionally align (i.e. 
Figure 15: Predictive Margins of Consumption on 
Voting, by Level of Active Engagement 
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Democrat # Conservative and Republican # Liberal) predicts lower likelihood of voting than 
identifying as an Independent # Moderate, while having a party ID but being “Not Sure” about 
one’s ideology predicts dramatically higher likelihood of voting than identifying as an 
independent moderate.  
Adding the variables for political knowledge to the model leads Consumption’s effect to 
all but disappear. In that model (6), both political knowledge scores are strongly predictive of 
voting (PersonalKnowledge more so than GeneralKnowledge), while Consumption’s effect is 
reduced in both magnitude and statistical significance. ActiveEngagement’s effect and that of the 
interaction term remain statistically insignificant, though both also revert closer to 1 (i.e. reduce 
in magnitude). Taken together, this provides strong evidence for mediation of social media news 
use’s effect on voting by political knowledge, as posited in H2. However, this mediation is only 
partial, as Consumption retains some statistical significance – if that term had become wholly 
insignificant, I could then claim complete mediation of news-related social media use’s effect on 
voting.  
In model 6, the pattern in voting as relates to Consumption and ActiveEngagement is still 
similar to that found in model 2; consumption predicts more voting, and engagement predicts 
less voting, though that negative effect is reduced as consumption increases and neither 
ActiveEngagement’s nor the interaction term’s effect is statistically significant. Now, however, 
the magnitude of Consumption’s effect has decreased, and an increase in Consumption score has 
slightly less of an impact on likelihood of voting than when the knowledge scores were not 
present in the regression. 
Holding everything else in the equation constant (active engagement level, political 
knowledge, other news use, age, gender, education, race, and strength of beliefs) someone with 
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the minimum possible Consumption score (did not consume any news over social media) was 
predicted to have a 58.95% likelihood of voting. Someone at the median value of Consumption 
was predicted to have a 60.2% likelihood of voting, and someone at the max value of 
Consumption was predicted to have a 64.6% likelihood of voting – so consuming news over 
social media does increase one’s likelihood of voting. Both the median and the max predictions 
are statistically different from the prediction at the minimum, though only to the p < 0.05 level. 
There is also a significant difference in voting between people with varying levels of 
political knowledge. This follows, if much of Consumption’s effect is mediated through 
knowledge, as indicated. People who correctly answered neither of the GeneralKnowledge 
questions were predicted to vote 52.05% of the time; compared to 58.5% of the time for people 
who were right on each question they attempted.  
An even larger jump is found when calculating predictive margins for 
PersonalKnowledge: people who attempted at least one question but correctly answered none of 
them were predicted to vote 38.5% of the time, compared to 51.2% of the time for people who 
got half of their attempted questions right and 63.6% of the time for people who aced all of the 
questions they attempted. In other words, 
people who got every question right that 
they attempted were 65% more likely to 
vote than people who attempted at least 
one question but got none right (a 
difference of almost 20 percentage points, 
as seen in Figure 16).  
Figure 16: Contrasts of Predictive Margins 
of PersonalKnowledge on Voting 
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These differences are so stark, that they must be driven by differences in more than just 
knowledge scores themselves, because the scores’ odds ratios, though large, are nowhere near 
large enough to account for overall twelve and twenty-five percentage-point differences. The 
next set of regressions (7 and 8) will investigate the differences in people by knowledge level. 
However, before moving on to those regressions, I quickly look at the remaining 
variables in regression (6). Specifically, I look at the effects of state and partisanship. First, I find 
that – as stated before – the state in which one lived was a statistically significant predictor of 
likelihood of voting. This comports with reality; state-level turnout varies from the low 40s to 
upper 70s. Interestingly, the effect of state in this regression is inversely related to actual turnout, 
as depicted in Figure 17; where turnout was already highest, social media news consumption 
made the least difference in it. Direct comparison of those trends is plotted in Figure 18 below, 
in which we see that turnout and the treatment effect are, in fact, inversely related (following, 
generally, a pattern of exponential decay). 
Figure 17: Heatmaps of Statewide Turnout and State-Level Contrasts in 
Predicted Turnout by Level of Social Media News Consumption 
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 Most states were 
generally like one another 
as regards turnout; 34 states 
fell within ± 1 standard 
deviation of the mean state-
level prediction turnout 
(57.6% ± 5.33%). Among 
those 34 states, the mean 
treatment effect was +4.71 
points. Among the six states 
with turnout more than one standard deviation below the mean, the mean treatment effect was 
4.21 points – and among the ten states with turnout more than one standard deviation above the 
mean, the mean treatment effect was 4.85 points. So, the treatment effect did vary by state, if 
only slightly.  
In addition to investigating state-level effects, I also looked at split models for Democrats 
and Republicans, separately. To do so, I ran model (6) for subpopulations of the survey sample, 
based on party ID – resulting in two sub-regressions, in which all respondents in each regression 
were either Democrats or Republicans, specifically. Doing so allows examination of whether 
patterns and relationships between variables are functioning differently for partisans of different 
colors.  
The results of those regressions are plotted in Figure 19, below, which shows that several 
variables perform quite differently between the two subpopulations. Perhaps most importantly, 
the knowledge variables’ effects were starkly different within the Democratic and within the 
Figure 18: Scatterplot of Statewide Turnout against State-Level 
Contrasts in Predicted Turnout by Level of Social Media News 
Consumption 
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Republican populations. Both knowledge scores had a stronger effect on voting among 
Democrats than among Republicans, suggesting that more-knowledgeable Democrats were more 
likely to vote than less-knowledgeable Democrats, but that Republicans were more similarly-
likely to vote regardless of knowledge level. This is particularly true of GeneralKnowledge, in 
which the effect in the Republican model is statistically insignificant. For PersonalKnowledge, 
more-knowledgeable Republicans are more likely to vote than less-knowledgeable Republicans, 
though that gap is smaller than it is for Democrats.  
Additionally, being female had a stronger effect on voting among Democrats than 
Republicans, though this may be influenced by the underlying gender characteristics of those two 
populations. Racial variables also may be experiencing similar patterns. Ideological “alignment” 
clearly predicted higher voting, while “misalignment” predicted lower voting; liberal Democrats 
voted more than liberal Independents, who voted more than liberal Republicans, and 
Figure 19: Odds Ratios Across Split Models of Voting by Party ID 
(Comparing Models Limited to only Democrats and only Republicans) 
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conservative Republicans voted more than conservative Independents, who voted more than 
conservative Democrats.  
Finally, we can see that the social media variables perform differently in these two sub-
regressions. For people of both parties, consuming social media news predicted higher voting. 
However, Active Engagement’s moderation effect on Consumption works completely 
differently. Democrats who were active social media sharers were predicted to vote less than 
their less-active peers, while actively-engaged Republicans were more likely to vote than their 
less-active peers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Predictive Margins of Social Media News Consumption 
on Voting by Level of Active Engagement, across Separate Models 
for Democrats and Republicans 
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3. Regressions of Political Knowledge on Social Media News Use 
Finally, Table 19 in Appendix B presents the results of regressions (7) and (8). As 
discussed in the section immediately above, there seem to be additional, significant differences 
among people with different political knowledge scores other than just their political knowledge 
score. The results presented in this section give insight into what those differences may be. As 
Table 19 shows, all but one variable used in both regressions are statistically significant 
predictors of knowledge levels, the exception being OtherNewsUse. Consuming news through 
social media was found to be a positive predictor of knowledge, as expected based on the 
mediation effect found in regressions (2) and (6) above. Additionally, as was the case when the 
outcome was voting, active engagement with social media news was a negative predictor of 
knowledge, when controlling for consumption. The interaction term was also again a positive 
predictor, indicating that ActiveEngagement’s negative effect reduces in magnitude as 
Consumption increases.  
The relationship between Consumption and ActiveEngagement is seen in Figure 21: for 
more than half of people, being more-highly engaged with social media news content actually 
predicts lower personal political 
knowledge. It is only at the highest 
levels of Consumption that one’s level of 
active engagement makes no difference 
on personal political knowledge. These 
findings provide evidence against H3, 
and contradict the theory put forward at 
Figure 21: Predictive Margins of Social Media 
News Consumption on Personal Political 
Knowledge, by Level of Active Engagement 
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the conclusion of Jung, Kim, and Gil de Zúñiga (2011) – further discussion can be found in the 
Conclusions chapter below. 
Among the demographic predictors, being older, higher income, and more educated are 
all positive predictors of political knowledge. For example, Figure 22 depicts respondents’ 
predicted accuracy on PersonalKnowledge questions by age; octogenarians are generally 20% 
more accurate on PersonalKnowledge questions than people just entering young adulthood. 
Additionally, being White predicts higher political knowledge than being Black, Hispanic, or 
Asian – though being Middle Eastern or self-identifying as “Other” predicts higher political 
knowledge than identifying as White.  
Notably, the results presented in 
Table 19 indicate a lingering gender 
difference in political knowledge; being 
male predicts a higher score on both general 
and personal political knowledge scores. 
However, that difference is less for the 
personal political knowledge score than for 
the general political knowledge score (an allowable comparison because both scores have the 
same range [0,1]). Women are generally 5.8% less accurate on GeneralKnowledge than men, but 
only 2.3% less accurate than men on PersonalKnowledge. This once again provides evidence 
that localizing/personalizing political knowledge questions is one way to reduce gender bias in 
political knowledge scores.  
Finally, both party ID and ideology are predictors of political knowledge. Taken 
individually, knowledge seems not to differ greatly among different ideologies; on party ID, 
Figure 22: Predictive Margins of Age on 
PersonalKnowledge Score 
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being an Independent does appear to predict higher knowledge than aligning with a party or 
being not sure. 
When the two trends are taken together, as 
in Figure 23, a pattern like that found in voting 
emerges. People with traditionally-aligned party 
IDs and ideologies (e.g. conservative Republicans) 
are more knowledgeable than people with 
traditionally-unaligned IDs and ideologies (e.g. 
liberal Republicans). Ideologically-aligned 
partisans on the whole also tend to know more than 
Independent moderates, a difference generally 
significant at the p < 0.05 level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Matrix of Predictive 
Margins of Personal Political 
Knowledge by Party ID and 
Ideology 
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Conclusions 
 The 2016 election was novel in many ways, including the use of social media by voters, 
media, candidates, and foreign influences. Based on the findings of this thesis, it appears that 
people’s interaction with political news through social media around the time of the election did 
partially predict whether they would participate in it. In this chapter, I review the results from 
Chapter Four above and synthesize key findings. In the first section below, I specifically evaluate 
each hypothesis that was formulated at the beginning of this thesis. Then, I consider the 
implications of this thesis’ findings both for the body of literature within which this thesis exists 
and for the stakeholders who are invested in the relationship between social media and voting. 
Finally, I qualify the findings of this thesis by enumerating its limitations and, mostly based on 
those limitations, I recommend several directions for future research. 
1. Evaluation of Hypotheses 
In analysis, evidence was found to support H1; after controlling for demographic factors, 
political beliefs, and getting news from other non-social media sources, consuming political 
news content over social media in the period shortly before the 2016 election was found to 
increase the likelihood that someone voted. If someone consumed social media news content, 
whether they then shared it, commented on it, or made their own post made no difference on 
their likelihood of voting. However, if someone did not consume content, but nonetheless 
otherwise actively engaged with content – i.e. shared it, commented on it, or created their own – 
they were found to be less likely to vote than people who neither consumed nor engaged with 
content. 
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Evidence was also found to support H2; the effect of social media news use was found to 
be partially mediated by political knowledge. Primary evidence of this is provided by the 
exponentiated coefficients on Consumption, ActiveEngagement, and their interaction across 
regressions (2) and (6). Upon the addition of political knowledge to the regression, the effects of 
social media news use are reduced in both magnitude and significance. Secondary support for a 
mediatory pathway is provided by regressions (7) and (8); social media news use was found to be 
a significant predictor of political knowledge level, which is necessary for political knowledge to 
be a mediator of social media news use’s effect on voting.  
Evidence was also found to support H3; most significantly, I found that Democrats’ odds 
of voting were more impacted by how much they know about politics, while Republicans’ 
likelihoods of voting were less conditional on how much they knew about politics. This affects 
the social media  knowledge pathway as well; Democrats who were active social media 
sharers were predicted to vote less than their less-active peers, while actively-engaged 
Republicans were more likely to vote than their less-active peers. 
Finally, both steps taken in attempt to reduce gender bias in measured political 
knowledge were found to help achieve that goal, as posited by H4 and H5. Limiting analysis to 
only attempted answers reduced the observed effect of gender on political knowledge, and the 
knowledge score which examined people’s awareness of their own representation was also less 
affected by gender than the score which measured people’s knowledge of larger political 
balances of power. However, it should be noted that the first step – limiting analysis – removed 
over 10,000 respondents from analysis and should therefore be taken with a grain of salt.  
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2. Limitations of Methods 
Several aspects of the research design, methods, and data used in this thesis should be 
noted for their impacts on its findings and their generalizability. First, as discussed in Chapter 
Three, the digital sampling frame used to collect the survey data limits the external validity of 
the findings in this thesis. Because only relatively-digitally-savvy people could participate in the 
survey, the sample is almost inevitably not representative of people who do not frequently use 
computers and the internet. As has been seen, this segment of the population is growing ever 
smaller; still, it cannot be discounted. 
Secondly, the secondary nature of the data limited the questions that could be used in 
analysis. The main constraint imposed as a result of this was on the questions used to evaluate 
respondents’ social media behavior. In the CCES, survey-takers were asked simply whether they 
had engaged in certain activities in the last twenty-four hours. As discussed above, this may 
actually be a more accurate measure than asking people to estimate the frequency of their use 
over any given time period. However, the standard in the field of social media study is to use 
measures of frequency, rather than a binary yes/no for having engaged at all. While this 
distinction does not limit the findings of this thesis per se, frequency measures likely would have 
had greater internal variation than the heavily bottom-weighted social media measures used in 
analysis.  
The nature of CCES data also limit the findings of this thesis in that they are 
observational, as are most survey data. Findings supporting the hypothesis that people who use 
social media for news are more knowledgeable and more likely to vote would be much stronger 
if gathered through an experiment, in which I was able to manipulate people’s social media use. 
Without this intervention, the causal claims that I have made are more tenuous. Some support for 
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the causal ordering that I have posited here is provided by previous work which tested each 
possible causal ordering and found the social media news use  knowledge  voting order to 
be the best fit for the data (Jung, Kim, & Gil de Zúñiga 2011). However, those findings are most 
relevant to only the election they studied (2008), and the most robust study of news-related social 
media use in the 2016 election would include some aspect of intervention/manipulation itself.  
3. Implications of Findings 
Many of the findings of this thesis are in concordance with prior research in the field, 
which suggests that social media’s effect on participation in the 2016 election did not differ 
tremendously from its effect on participation in previous contexts. Primarily, the findings that 
social media news consumption predicts higher likelihood of voting and that that effect was 
found to be mediated by political knowledge build upon the foundation established by Kenski 
and Stroud (2006), Shah et al. (2005), and Jung, Kim, and Gil de Zúñiga (2011).  
Other evidence found in this thesis also adds to previous research regarding gender bias 
in analytical methods for evaluating political knowledge; the process of excluding “don’t know” 
answers from analysis and using questions that are more personalized to the individual 
respondent was shown to produce a less gender-biased score for political knowledge – a 
combination of steps like those taken by Fortin-Rittberger (2016) and Miller (2018).   
The primary finding of this thesis, that using social media for political news impacts 
voting, bears directly on not only policymakers, but also media companies and social media 
platforms themselves, all of whom are, at this moment, attempting to sort out for themselves the 
extent to which social media impacts elections. The indication, in this thesis, that consuming 
news content through social media is associated with higher political knowledge is a positive 
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note, signaling that people are paying attention to the news stories that come across their feeds. 
However, that same fact should also be taken as a sign of increased urgency for the “fake news” 
debate. While this thesis was able to test for the normatively-positive effect on knowledge of 
people consuming social media news content, it was not able to test for adverse effects, because 
it had no way to distinguish between people’s exposure to “real” and “fake” news. Therefore, 
while people did benefit in at least one identifiable way from using social media for political 
news, there may be myriad other ways that they were impacted that could not be not tested for in 
this thesis, such as an increased likelihood to believe false stories about the election.   
Additionally, the second main finding of this thesis, that people who do not consume 
news content through social media – yet still share such content – are both less politically 
knowledgeable and less civically engaged (through voting) is a cause for concern. It should be 
noted that this finding goes against the theory put forward at the end of Jung, Kim, and Gil de 
Zúñiga (2011). That paper found that, although social media news consumption does predict 
both political knowledge and voting, its effect on political knowledge is practically small. The 
authors theorize in their conclusions that, in order to “acquire” political knowledge, more intense 
processing of information may be required than just consuming it (423). That theory would 
suggest that, in this thesis, ActiveEngagement would be a positive predictor of political 
knowledge, and indeed a stronger one than Consumption.  
However, as has been seen, such is not the case. When people both consume and actively 
engage with content, they gained no more knowledge than if they had only consumed content, 
and when people only actively engaged and did not consume, they actually were predicted to 
have less knowledge than if they had done neither. Barring a measurement or modeling error, the 
logical conclusion of this finding is that a non-trivial portion of the people sharing political news 
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content on social media are less knowledgeable and less involved in the formal political process 
than average. When taken in combination with several sets of investigators’ findings regarding 
social media “opinion leaders’” capacity to influence vast numbers of other users with their posts 
(Morrell 2012; Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2014; Allcott & Gentzkow 2017; Weeks, Ardèvol-Abreu, & 
Gil de Zúñiga 2017), that possibility becomes a strong argument for further refinement of social 
media platforms’ processes regarding news, such as the step already taken to identify “trusted” 
or locally-relevant news sources on Facebook (Mosseri 2018).  
4. Suggestions for Future Research 
The questions asked and methods used in conducting research into social media and its 
effects are constantly in flux, due to the ever-changing nature of the platform. Since the 2016 
election, that has especially been the case, since social media sites have started to be clued into 
the extent of their influence. This thesis contributes to the literature that illuminates social 
media’s influence – but there are extensions of this thesis’ analysis that could take its findings 
even further.  
First and foremost, future research would benefit greatly from use of an experimental, 
rather than an observational, design. The claims of causality made in this thesis would be much 
stronger if they were the result of intervention. However, this approach can also be difficult in 
the context of a specific election. For example, I, in 2019, could not perform experimental 
research about the 2016 election – nor might any researchers at the time of the 2016 election 
have anticipated the full extent of the role that social media would play in that election and 
therefore perform such an experiment. Going forward, however, that option always remains.  
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Secondly, as has been mentioned several times throughout, future research would benefit 
greatly from the ability to distinguish between “real” news and “fake” news stories when 
examining the effect of social media use on political knowledge and voting. Studies have begun 
to develop methods for distinguishing between the two types; Silverman (2016) used post-level 
data from Facebook to draw conclusions at the content level (though subsequent authors have 
called those methods into question – Rinehart 2017). Perhaps an extension or modification of his 
method could be used to examine Facebook data at the user level – tying together the individual-
level analysis of this thesis with “fake news” exposure information from Facebook.  
Additionally, future research would benefit from the ability to include personality among 
its control variables. In this thesis, personality was left to reside in the error terms of regressions; 
however, as reviewed in Chapter Two, it is a very useful predictor of social media behavior, and 
it may also be tied to voting, though the connection has been made less rigorously (Samek 2016). 
The connection between various personality traits and political knowledge gain from social 
media news use would be of great interest, as well. For example, would openness to experience 
(one of the Big Five personality traits) affect the amount of political knowledge gleaned from 
consuming news content? It seems reasonable to expect so. 
Future research into political knowledge should also, as the trend has been, continue to 
refine the questions used to evaluate that construct. The more-personalized questions used in this 
thesis did prove to be less subject to gender bias than the broader, nationally-scaled questions; 
however, other questions have proved to be even more effective in reducing gender bias, such as 
the gender-relevant questions used by Dolan (2011). Inclusion of such knowledge questions in 
large, national data sets like the CCES would certainly be a boon to that field of research. 
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Finally, future work might consider a direct extension of this thesis with an added a time 
dimension: apply the methods of this thesis to not only 2016 CCES data, but also CCES data 
from the 2008 and 2012 elections, and potentially the midterm elections in-between. Such 
longitudinal analysis would allow tracking of news-related social media use’s effect over the 
time period in which social media were developed and grew to prominence.  
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Appendix A: Factor Analysis Output 
Table 10: Frequency Distribution of Social Media Use Response Patterns 
Pattern* Raw Count Frequency (%) 
00000 27,192 42.09 
00010 10,281 15.91 
11111 4,517 6.99 
00011 2,942 4.55 
11110 1,920 2.97 
01010 1,472 2.28 
01000 1,316 2.04 
11010 1,321 2.04 
00110 1,268 1.96 
00100 1,147 1.78 
00001 1,066 1.65 
10010 1,060 1.64 
00111 1,035 1.60 
10000 1,034 1.60 
01011 984 1.52 
11011 957 1.48 
01110 724 1.12 
01111 697 1.08 
10110 660 1.02 
10011 508 0.79 
11000 502 0.78 
10111 412 0.64 
01001 269 0.42 
11100 250 0.39 
01100 227 0.35 
10100 220 0.34 
11001 200 0.31 
10001 107 0.17 
00101 105 0.16 
11101 89 0.14 
01101 70 0.11 
10101 48 0.07 
Total. 64,600 100.00 
Roberson 93 
 
 
Table 11: Social Media Behavior Preliminary EFA Results A 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Communality 
Post Content 0.7311 -0.2506 0.0311 0.0474 0.6006 
Post Comment 0.7312 -0.1578 -0.1226 0.0229 0.5752 
Forward Content 0.6602 -0.0220 0.1275 -0.0559 0.4557 
Read/Watch 
Content 0.5756 0.2534 0.0118 0.0802 0.4021 
Follow Event 0.5848 0.2860 -0.0411 -0.0465 0.4276 
*Iterated Principal Factors Method, No Rotation, No Factor Limit 
 
Table 12: Social Media Behavior Preliminary EFA Results B 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Communality 
Post Content 0.7433 -0.2791 0.6303 
Post Comment 0.7189 -0.1249 0.5324 
Forward Content 0.6532 -0.0161 0.4269 
Read/Watch Content 0.5710 0.2315 0.3796 
Follow Event 0.5880 0.2986 0.4349 
*Iterated Principal Factors Method, No Rotation, 2 Factor Limit 
 
Table 13: Social Media Behavior EFA Results - No Omitted Loadings 
Variable ActiveEngagement Consumption Communality 
Post Content 0.8236 -0.0428 0.6303 
Post Comment 0.6138 0.1527 0.5324 
Forward Content 0.4351 0.2227 0.4269 
Read/Watch Content 0.0710 0.5640 0.3796 
Follow Event -0.0028 0.6614 0.4349 
*Iterated Principal Factors Method, Oblique Promax Rotation, 2 Factor Limit 
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Table 14: Frequency Distribution of Political Knowledge Response Patterns 
Pattern* Frequency Percent Pattern* Frequency Percent 
111111 22,123 35.08 100010 321 0.51 
000000 7,482 11.86 001111 308 0.49 
111110 3,028 4.8 101010 312 0.49 
111100 2,870 4.55 011000 304 0.48 
101111 2,808 4.45 110011 279 0.44 
100000 1,532 2.43 010100 272 0.43 
111101 1,525 2.42 110110 261 0.41 
101100 1,220 1.93 000110 238 0.38 
100100 986 1.56 001011 235 0.37 
111011 965 1.53 100101 225 0.36 
000011 912 1.45 111001 206 0.33 
100111 884 1.4 100001 193 0.31 
110111 873 1.38 101001 182 0.29 
101000 864 1.37 010111 178 0.28 
000100 848 1.34 110010 175 0.28 
101011 806 1.28 001010 172 0.27 
101110 711 1.13 011011 163 0.26 
001000 648 1.03 001110 157 0.25 
000010 607 0.96 110101 159 0.25 
100011 600 0.95 011110 153 0.24 
110100 568 0.9 000101 146 0.23 
111000 558 0.88 010011 141 0.22 
110000 484 0.77 110001 118 0.19 
101101 445 0.71 010110 116 0.18 
001100 443 0.7 011010 106 0.17 
010000 431 0.68 001001 99 0.16 
011111 424 0.67 001101 94 0.15 
011100 381 0.6 011101 80 0.13 
100110 376 0.6 010010 67 0.11 
000111 373 0.59 011001 61 0.1 
000001 347 0.55 010001 50 0.08 
111010 325 0.52 010101 47 0.07 
  Subtotal. 57,447 91.07 Subtotal 5,618 8.91 
Total 63,065 (99.98% of total dataset n – 64,600) 
*From left to right: Party of Governor, Representative, Senator 1, Senator 2, Congressional 
Majority, Senate Majority. “1” indicates respondent answered correctly. 
SOURCE: Recoding of variables from Ansolabehere and Schafner 2017 
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Table 15: Political Knowledge Preliminary EFA Results A 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Communality 
House Majority 0.7071 0.3880 0.0004 0.0018 -0.0310 0.6515 
Senate Majority 0.6855 0.3991 0.0060 -0.0060 0.0304 0.6302 
Governor 0.7015 -0.1853 -0.1386 -0.0558 0.0148 0.5489 
Representative 0.6773 -0.1909 0.1394 0.0582 0.0145 0.5182 
Senator 1 0.7340 -0.2185 0.0696 -0.1056 -0.0147 0.6027 
Senator 2 0.7057 -0.1818 -0.0747 0.1134 -0.0118 0.5497 
*Iterated Principal Factors Method, No Rotation, No Factor Limit 
 
Table 16: Political Knowledge Preliminary EFA Results B 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Communality 
House Majority 0.7096 0.3824 0.6498 
Senate Majority 0.6879 0.3935 0.6280 
Governor 0.6960 -0.1830 0.5178 
Representative 0.6718 -0.1878 0.4866 
Senator 1 0.7308 -0.2196 0.5823 
Senator 2 0.7019 -0.1825 0.5260 
*Iterated Principal Factors Method, No Rotation, 2 Factor Limit  
 
Table 17: Political Knowledge EFA Results – No Omitted Loadings 
Variable PersonalKnowledge GeneralKnowedge Communality 
House Majority 0.0624 0.7650 0.6498 
Senate Majority 0.0354 0.7695 0.6280 
Governor 0.6753 0.0668 0.5178 
Representative 0.6642 0.0508 0.4866 
Senator 1 0.7394 0.0365 0.5823 
Senator 2 0.6789 0.0699 0.5260 
*Iterated Principal Factors Method, Oblique Promax Rotation, 2 Factor Limit 
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Appendix B: Logit Regression Tables 
Table 18: Full Logit Regressions of Voting on Social Media, Mediated and Unmediated, with 
and without State Fixed Effects 
Model Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 
State Fixed Effects       
Mediation Variables       
Treatment of “Not 
Sure” Responses N/A N/A Missing Incorrect Missing Incorrect 
Observations 47,400 47,400 35,120 46,359 35,120 46,359 
Hosmer-Lemeshow 
Test p-Value 0.0363 0.2776 0.0021 0.1446 0.0048 0.2276 
Social Media News:       
    Consumption 1.135*** 1.140*** 1.118** 1.086* 1.119** 1.089* 
    Active Engagement 0.964 0.965 0.936 0.975 0.941 0.976 
    Consumption *  
    Active Engagement 1.027 1.024 1.034 1.017 1.03 1.014 
Political Knowledge:       
    General   1.683*** 1.356*** 1.660*** 1.348*** 
    Personal   3.160*** 2.684*** 3.217*** 2.740*** 
Other News Use 0.978 0.979 0.889 0.846*** 0.891 0.847** 
Age 1.029*** 1.029*** 1.024*** 1.021*** 1.024*** 1.021*** 
Income 1.015** 1.018** 0.996 0.997 0.999 1.000 
Female 1.05 1.055 1.124** 1.219*** 1.131*** 1.225*** 
Education  
(“Base = HS or Less”): 
      
     Some college 1.402*** 1.397*** 1.223*** 1.257*** 1.223*** 1.255*** 
    2-year 1.378*** 1.365*** 1.208** 1.254*** 1.197** 1.245*** 
    4-year 1.255*** 1.255*** 1.035 1.060 1.033 1.061 
    Post-grad 1.272*** 1.280*** 1.049 1.059 1.05 1.063 
Race  
(Base = “White”): 
      
    Black 0.761*** 0.802*** 0.748*** 0.774*** 0.784*** 0.809*** 
    Hispanic 0.671*** 0.754*** 0.669*** 0.697*** 0.754*** 0.786*** 
    Asian 0.405*** 0.426*** 0.426*** 0.415*** 0.459*** 0.441*** 
    Native American 0.774 0.785 0.679* 0.833 0.700* 0.849 
    Middle Eastern 0.605 0.611 0.430 0.564 0.413 0.559 
    Mixed 0.873 0.894 0.885 0.872 0.921 0.894 
    Other 0.823 0.829 0.742 0.788 0.753 0.794 
Party ID  
(Base = Independent): 
      
    Democrat 1.112 1.112 1.186* 1.147* 1.187* 1.147* 
    Republican 1.149 1.165* 1.112 1.236** 1.141 1.248** 
    Other 1.642* 1.581* 1.669* 1.466 1.581* 1.411 
    Not Sure 0.509*** 0.514*** 0.566** 0.650** 0.571** 0.659** 
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Model Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ideology  
(Base = Moderate): 
      
    Liberal 1.313*** 1.304*** 1.313** 1.229** 1.307** 1.223** 
    Conservative 1.135 1.136 1.09 1.099 1.085 1.101 
    Not Sure 0.411*** 0.410*** 0.562* 0.575*** 0.576* 0.576*** 
Party ID # Ideology 
Interactions  
(Bases = Independent 
and Moderate): 
      
    Democrat # Liberal 1.09 1.093 0.971 1.028 0.976 1.03 
    Democrat #  
    Conservative 0.564*** 0.570*** 0.581*** 0.619*** 0.594*** 0.623*** 
    Democrat # Not Sure 2.685*** 2.667*** 2.377* 2.239*** 2.314* 2.209*** 
    Republican # Liberal 0.338*** 0.349*** 0.357*** 0.380*** 0.362*** 0.392*** 
    Republican #  
    Conservative 1.141 1.132 1.089 1.032 1.077 1.026 
    Republican # Not  
    Sure 2.471*** 2.345*** 4.273** 2.328** 3.759* 2.211** 
    Other # Liberal 0.705 0.761 0.615 0.727 0.687 0.784 
    Other # Conservative 1.047 1.069 0.879 0.988 0.912 1.012 
    Other # Not Sure 0.585 0.614 0.593 0.493* 0.617 0.508 
    Not Sure # Liberal 0.819 0.826 1.005 0.835 1.039 0.849 
    Not Sure #  
    Conservative 0.802 0.787 1.363 0.909 1.358 0.893 
    Not Sure # Not Sure 1.338 1.33 1.388 1.077 1.356 1.068 
State (Base = CA):       
    Alabama  0.991   1.016 1.062 
    Alaska  1.819   1.799 1.810 
    Arizona  0.991   0.999 1.025 
    Arkansas  1.150   1.448 1.251 
    Colorado  1.308*   1.406* 1.415** 
    Connecticut  1.044   1.095 1.104 
    Delaware  1.085   1.234 1.203 
    Florida  0.875   0.906 0.919 
    Georgia  1.016   1.176 1.111 
    Hawaii  1.094   0.745 0.959 
    Idaho  0.897   0.901 0.844 
    Illinois  1.073   1.125 1.134 
    Indiana  1.400**   1.390* 1.520*** 
    Iowa  1.672***   1.794** 1.549** 
    Kansas  1.248   1.431 1.240 
    Kentucky  0.867   0.890 0.859 
    Louisiana  0.966   0.871 1.001 
    Maine  1.904**   2.248** 1.832** 
    Maryland  1.207   1.360* 1.325* 
    Massachusetts  0.958   0.961 1.010 
    Michigan  1.216*   1.321* 1.300** 
    Minnesota  1.308*   1.348* 1.282* 
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Model Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 
    Mississippi  0.923   0.806 0.899 
    Missouri  1.381**   1.487** 1.368** 
    Montana  1.462   1.442 1.440 
    Nebraska  1.140   1.083 1.119 
    Nevada  1.452*   1.288 1.647** 
    New Hampshire  1.327   1.456 1.230 
    New Jersey  0.828   0.891 0.860 
    New Mexico  1.230   1.240 1.264 
    New York  0.908   0.924 0.973 
    North Carolina  1.259*   1.260* 1.315** 
    North Dakota  1.360   0.943 1.371 
    Ohio  1.326**   1.316* 1.365** 
    Oklahoma  1.086   0.877 1.134 
    Oregon  1.519***   1.649*** 1.598*** 
    Pennsylvania  1.309**   1.332** 1.402*** 
    Rhode Island  0.851   1.101 0.811 
    South Carolina  1.169   1.282 1.178 
    South Dakota  0.963   0.914 0.904 
    Tennessee  0.900   0.940 0.9200 
    Texas  0.853   0.886 0.878 
    Utah  1.197   1.250 1.103 
    Vermont  1.033   1.164 1.097 
    Virginia  1.007   0.969 1.055 
    Washington  1.373**   1.425* 1.410** 
    West Virginia  0.937   1.013 1.063 
    Wisconsin  1.222   1.265 1.159 
    Wyoming  0.875   1.105 0.851 
Exponentiated coefficients, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 19: Fractional Logit Regressions of Political Knowledge on Social Media News Use 
(Regression #) Political Knowledge Outcome: (7) General (8) Personal 
Social Media News:   
    Consumption 1.243*** 1.187** 
    Active Engagement 0.818*** 0.821*** 
    Consumption * Active Engagement 1.121*** 1.143*** 
Other News Use 1.103 1.057 
Age 1.027*** 1.030*** 
Income 1.041*** 1.050*** 
Female 0.665*** 0.761*** 
Education (“Base = No HS”)   
    High school graduate 0.97 1.044 
    Some college 1.459** 1.568*** 
    2-year 1.284 1.326* 
    4-year 1.512*** 1.720*** 
    Post-grad 1.705*** 1.867*** 
Race (Base = “White”)   
    Black 0.807** 0.760*** 
    Hispanic 0.707*** 0.818* 
    Asian 0.744** 0.722* 
    Native American 0.78 0.697 
    Middle Eastern 2.974** 1.197 
    Mixed 1.239 1.199 
    Other 1.148 1.939** 
Party ID (Base = Independent) 
    Strong Democrat 0.631*** 0.688** 
    Democrat 0.993 0.915 
    Republican 1.094 0.843 
    Strong Republican 0.584*** 0.537*** 
    Not Sure 1.33 1.09 
Ideology (Base = Moderate) 
    Very Liberal 1.596 1.014 
    Liberal 0.867 0.636* 
    Conservative 1.251 0.76 
    Very Conservative 2.315** 1.257 
    Not Sure 0.640* 0.334*** 
Party ID * Ideology Interactions  
(Bases = Independent & Moderate) 
  
    Strong Democrat * Very Liberal 1.445 1.831 
    Strong Democrat * Liberal 2.298*** 2.899*** 
    Strong Democrat * Conservative 0.468*** 0.759 
    Strong Democrat * Very Conservative 0.189*** 0.389* 
    Strong Democrat * Not Sure 1.105 2.146* 
    Democrat * Very Liberal 1.555 2.801** 
    Democrat * Liberal 1.783** 1.981** 
    Democrat * Conservative 0.371*** 0.578* 
    Democrat * Very Conservative 0.127*** 0.261** 
    Democrat * Not Sure 1.154 2.209 
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 Table 10 (Cont.): Frac. Logit Regressions of Political Knowledge on Social Media Use 
(Regression #) Political Knowledge Outcome: (3) General (4) Personal 
    Republican * Very Liberal 0.73 0.366* 
    Republican * Liberal 0.546 0.748 
    Republican * Conservative 0.98 1.750** 
    Republican * Very Conservative 0.796 2.380* 
    Republican * Not Sure 2.073 0.94 
    Strong Republican * Very Liberal 0.727 0.612 
    Strong Republican * Liberal 1.257 0.763 
    Strong Republican * Conservative 2.096*** 3.100*** 
    Strong Republican * Very Conservative 1.18 1.796 
    Strong Republican * Not Sure 1.21 3.378* 
    Not Sure * Very Liberal 0.0484** 0.739 
    Not Sure * Liberal 0.676 0.341 
    Not Sure * Conservative 0.283* 0.494 
    Not Sure * Very Conservative 0.141*** 0.0979*** 
    Not Sure * Not Sure 0.487 1.257 
Observations                35105                 35105 
Exponentiated coefficients, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
